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CONNECTION, CAPACITY AND MORALITY
IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS:
DIALOGUES AND COMMENTARY
ROBERT DINERSTEIN, STEPHEN ELLMANN, ISABELLE GUNNING
& ANN SHALLECK*
As important, and difficult, as it is to offer new law students clear
and helpful frameworks for the interpersonal work of lawyering, do-
ing so is only part of what a clinical textbook may aspire to. In our
textbook-in-progress, we hope to offer both frameworks and support
for students' sense of the incompleteness of every framework and for
their recognition of the need for careful, flexible response to each in-
dividual client. Even care and flexibility by themselves are not
enough, however, and every text must choose which aspects of law-
yer-client relationships it will emphasize most. In the sections that fol-
low, we focus on lawyers' development of "connection in context,"
emotional connection and common ground with clients forged even
across considerable gaps of difference; on the application of these
skills across especially large contextual gaps, as illustrated in an inter-
view with a client with a mild intellectual disability; and on the ethics
and skills of making one special form of connection with a client, the
moral relationship entailed in a "moral dialogue." These dialogues
and commentaries explore many complex moments between lawyer
and client, but they also reaffirm the central importance of a funda-
mental skill and virtue - listening - in the lawyer's work of creating,
in each case, a theory of the representation.
* Robert Dinerstein is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,
American University, Washington College of Law. Stephen Ellmann is Professor of Law
and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, New York Law School. Isabelle Gunning is
Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. Ann Shalleck is Professor of
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INTRODUCTION
A textbook on interviewing and counseling is, in part, a primer
for very inexperienced students or new lawyers. New interviewers and
counselors cannot just be asked to sink or swim. They will probably
not sink, but they may never learn to swim well, and meanwhile their
clients will be consigned to endure their initial, often fumbling, efforts
to learn. For these readers, and their clients, a textbook must offer
clear frameworks for new practitioners' initial efforts.
At the same time, no framework can be followed blindly. Be-
cause the real world is a world of vast variation and unpredictability,
as we wrote in the most recent issue of the Clinical Law Review, "[w]e
want students to be able to think flexibly and creatively about how to
approach the variety of interactions that can occur within the lawyer-
client relationship, rather than unreflectively reverting to a standard-
ized vision of the relationship that makes other interactions seem de-
viant."' To teach such flexibility and creativity requires more than a
book, but a book can help by reflecting some measure of the potential
nuance and difficulty of actual situations in the examples and analyses
it offers.
One might imagine that what a textbook should do, then, is to
provide useful frameworks and a comprehensive analysis of the varia-
tions on those frameworks that are likely to arise. But just as people
perceive their everyday surroundings with the aid of any number of
simplifying and guiding preconceptions, so a textbook must reflect
choices about which of the countless issues presented in any client
interaction deserve most emphasis. Moreover, clinical teachers and
practicing lawyers have not evolved and can hardly devise perfect so-
lutions to the problems of interviewing and counseling, and so a text-
book can also be the occasion for exploration that goes beyond the
description of useful, basic frameworks to suggest approaches and
perspectives that have not yet become second nature.
With these thoughts in mind, we hope to highlight several themes
in our book.2 One is the importance of the contexts within which law-
yers encounter their clients. "Contexts" are multi-faceted, of course,
and range from situational factors as simple (and as profound) as the
location where the attorney first meets the client, to broad societally
shaped differences like race, class, gender, sexual orientation, disabil-
ity, culture or citizenship status. Contexts in turn affect, and are af-
fected by, a second theme, connection. Clients will have families and
I Robert Dinerstein, Stephen Ellmann, Isabelle Gunning & Ann Shalleck, Legal Inter-
viewing and Counseling: An Introduction, 10 CLIN. L. REv. 281, 291 (2003).
2 See id. at 294-306.
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communities to which they are connected, and these bonds may or
may not be culturally or socially similar to those of the lawyer's own
life. These connections and differences will in turn affect the kind of
connections that lawyers make with their clients. Finally, a third
theme, intersecting with and to some extent growing out of the first
two, is ethics - the ethical concerns, some explicit in the professional
codes and some not, that infuse every step of lawyers' response to
those contexts and connections.
In the sections that follow, we offer examples of the ways that we
seek to bring these themes together. Each of these sections is very
much a work in progress, and we offer them in the hope that readers
will respond with comments and critiques. 3 Our goal in our text, as we
have explained, is to unite the basic skills involved in interviewing and
counseling with these important overarching themes we have identi-
fied. Rather than focus in this excerpt on the particular models we are
developing for the range of skills involved in interviewing and coun-
seling, however, we present here illustrations of how we have ex-
plored the themes of context, connection and ethics in conjunction
with some of the fundamental interviewing skills being presented to
the student reader. Specifically, in Part I we focus on crucial building
block skills required for constructing connection in context, through
examples of lawyers' efforts, sometimes well-aimed and sometimes
not, to convey emotional connection and find common ground with
their clients. In Part II we seek to emphasize both the variations, and
the commonalities, in building connection across especially large con-
textual gaps of difference, by looking closely at an interview with a
client with a mild intellectual disability. Finally, in Part III we focus
particularly on connection and on ethics, in a discussion of whether,
and if so how, lawyers should engage in "moral dialogue" with their
clients. We hope that together the dialogues and commentary in these
sections will help clarify the issues with which lawyers wrestle and
help potential readers to begin to develop, overall and in each individ-
ual case, the "theories of representation" that they will use to guide
their work. 4
I. BUILDING CONNECTION IN CONTEXT
The task of building connection in context is a pervasive issue in
any lawyer-client relationship. Everything the lawyer does may affect
the connections she establishes with her client (and so will everything
the client brings to the encounter, including the other connections that
3 Needless to say, we also would be delighted to provide drafts for any clinical teachers
interested in experimenting with them as teaching materials.
4 See Dinerstein et al., supra note 1, at 307-08.
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help shape his life). We focus here on three aspects of the lawyer's
task: first, the process of conveying empathy and other emotional sup-
port; second, the lawyer's responsibilities in responding to her own
feelings of similarity, to, or difference from, the client; and, third, an
illustration of the lawyer's work in the early stages of an interview, in
hearing the client's story despite the potential and even the reality of
some significant misunderstandings across difference.
A. Conveying Empathy and Other Emotional Support
1. Empathy and other supportive emotions
Empathy and its cousins, including sympathy, approval and sup-
port, are key ingredients in the kind of respectful and helping lawyer-
client relationship that we envision. These qualities are not easily de-
finable, however, and they overlap.5 Empathy is a sharing of some of
the feelings that the client expresses, as the lawyer seeks to imagine
what it would be like to be in the client's emotional state so as to
understand, nonjudgmentally, the various aspects of the client's situa-
tion. Sympathy, or identification, is a stronger, more emotional, shar-
ing with the client, in which your own self-awareness is reduced as you
put yourself in the client's situation and emotional state. Your identifi-
cation with your client's circumstance and perspective can lend an ur-
gency to your desire to help the client resolve his predicament or task.
More plainly, approval, direct expression of agreement with or admi-
ration for some aspect of the client's actions or words, is by definition
judgmental. Finally, whether or not a lawyer conveys empathy, sympa-
thy or approval for her client, she must at least offer support - an
assertion, with some authenticity, that she is willing to help. Each of
these emotions may have a place in lawyer-client relationships, but in
the following discussion we focus primarily on empathy, which we
view as particularly important.
2. Active listening and empathy
First and foremost, it is crucial to listen. There are many tools to
aid in real listening, but here we focus on one of the most critical:
active listening. Active listening is a particular form of listening that
involves conveying to the speaker, here your client, that you have
heard both the substance of what she has said as well as its emotional
5 Scholars have debated how to define empathy, and the definitions we give here are
meant only as practical working definitions to guide subsequent discussions. For helpful
psychological definitions of sympathy and empathy, see Lauren Wispd, The Distinction Be-
tween Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a Concept, A Word Is Needed, 50 J. PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 314, 318 (1986). See Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 991, 991-93 (1992) for a review of the various uses of empathy in clinical legal
literature.
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content. You do this by "mirroring" or paraphrasing what you have
heard said explicitly, and by putting into words the implicit feelings
emanating from the speaker; sometimes you may answer on only one
of these levels (addressing explicit content or implicit feelings, but not
both), but often you will need to respond both to the client's words
and to his emotions. It is important to note that you will or should use
active listening from the moment you meet your client, and consist-
ently thereafter, as a way to verify for yourself and your client that
you understand what he has told you and as a way of demonstrating
your respect for and sympathy with his concerns.
Consider these examples:
In the first dialogue, Harriet Long, a family lawyer, is a divorced
African American woman in her 50's. Her client, Betty Ann Jackson,
is also in her 50's, but Caucasian. Jackson seeks Long's help for a di-
vorce and custody matter.
Li: Mrs. Jackson, good to finally meet you in person. Please sit.
How may I help you today?
Cl: Hello, Ms. Long. Well after 25 years of marriage, of putting
him through dental school and raising his children, my
husband has found someone younger, thinner and childless
and I need to decide how to kill him and get away with it.
L2: Ah Mrs. Jackson .... I see. After all you have done in this
marriage, you fear this affair will break it up.
C2: I guess that is fair. Although he has said that he wants to
leave me for ... her, so it seems like the marriage is pretty
much over.
(A few minutes later in the conversation):
L3: So, Mrs Jackson .... After many years of marriage where
you have been an enormous support and helpmate to your
husband and mother to his and your children, your husband
has made it clear that this recent affair will break up your
marriage and you are hurt and angry.
C3: Yes. I can't believe that this is happening. He was never a
cheat .... and I guess I thought if he did he would be like
my friends' husbands who still stay in the marriage but this
.... That he would really leave after all these years!
L4: Okay. So you may well be facing a divorce. And we can talk
about the specifics of that. I recognize that this kind of
circumstance is bound to cause some very strong feelings in
you and I want us to address those. But let's agree to put
the killing issue aside, shall we? Tell me more about how
you are feeling about what your husband said and what you
think, now, you would like to do about it?
Spring 2004]
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Here attorney Long immediately learns from her new client that
a divorce matter is the likely legal object of this representation and
that her client is quite bitter and unhappy. She uses active listening to
show her client that she has heard the gist of what the client has said.
Long's response at L2 both paraphrases some of the facts- "after all
you have done"-and names one of the possible emotions involved,
fear. When an attorney should do a summary of the facts that appear
most important, along with a more complete restatement of the cli-
ent's emotions as the lawyer has heard them, is a judgment call that
turns on how the rest of the conversation has progressed, but you
should certainly consider making such a statement to your client. At-
torney Long summarizes her understanding of the facts and emotions
at L3 where she paraphrases all the facts-the marriage has been long,
the wife has taken care of the husband in some respects and there are
children-and names the emotions-hurt and anger-that underlie
the assertion "I need to decide how to kill him and get away with it."
The lawyer's restatement of "killing him" as "hurt and anger"
demonstrates several characteristics of active listening. First, her re-
sponse was not a "stupid" or literal paraphrase of the client's state-
ment. Long does not say "Ah Mrs. Jackson, you want to take out a
contract on your husband's life and need my help in drawing up the
particulars." The lawyer understands that the client's words are much
more likely an expression of emotion than of criminal intent, and she
rightly avoids attributing to the client a literal meaning that is extreme
and offensive. Second, however, while the phrase "kill him" probably
is a figure of speech, the lawyer also picks up on the acute ethical issue
that would be raised if there is any literal truth to the assertion, and
she puts herself on record immediately as discouraging the client from
even thinking about pursuing such a course of action. And third, no-
tice that in lightly discouraging the client from thinking that killing
would be appropriate, the attorney is disagreeing with her client.
Young lawyers and students sometimes think that active listening and
the support it conveys mean never disagreeing with your client. How-
ever, you will have occasions to disagree with clients; and many of
those times clients will expect to hear your differing opinions. 6
Sometimes the client's feelings will be farther from the surface
than in our first example, In the following dialogue, Allen Anderson,
an employment discrimination attorney, is a white male in his 40's
who, due to a shooting, cannot walk and uses a wheel chair. His client,
Anthony Braxton, is also a white male and in a wheel chair, but in his
late 20's.
6 For an example, see infra Part III (discussing "moral dialogue" with clients).
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Li: Mr. Braxton, it is a pleasure to meet you. I see you were
given coffee. So ... make yourself comfortable and please
tell me what employment matter I can help you with?
C1: Well Mr. Anderson, where to begin? Well for one thing I
just learned this morning that all of my coworkers at the
brokerage firm I work at, Burnham and Block, make almost
twice as much money as I do and I figured I should talk with
a lawyer about my options.
L2: All right, Mr. Braxton. You learned something today that
you had not known before, which is that you are apparently
the lowest paid employee at your job and you feel that this
fact, if true, is unfair and want to know if the law can help.
C2: Well it's true. And it's not just unfair. I have worked hard,
gotten the highest evaluations and gone through . . . well,
just not gotten any kind of support at that office.
L3: It sounds as if with your work record and evaluations you
should be at or near the top of the pay scale and so you are
feeling quite angry and maybe even surprised by this
revelation.
C3: Yes, but maybe not entirely surprised.
L4: Please tell me more. How did you discover this and why
aren't you surprised?
Here attorney Anderson, while given facts, is not given much
emotional content to work with based upon what his client tells him.
In an actual interview, of course, there may be any number of nonver-
bal cues that convey the client's emotional state, like the tone or in-
tensity of his voice, facial expressions, the color of the eyes or skin,
and the movements of different parts of the body.7 Still, despite the
(possible) paucity of information, the attorney forges ahead and both
describes the facts he has heard ("you learned something today...
you are apparently the lowest paid") and attaches a likely emotional
state ("you feel this is unfair"). The inferences the lawyer makes
about the client's emotional reaction are plausible; they fit with the
juxtaposition of the client's discovery of his low pay and his seemingly
immediate consultation with a lawyer. But the lawyer could be wrong.
Indeed in this case, the client does not really feel that "unfair"
7 While these cues can be valuable, they are also easily misread, especially across cul-
tural differences. See Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures:
Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 373 (2002); Michelle S. Jacobs, People From the
Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 345 (1997). For a valuable discussion of how to approach teaching cultural compe-
tence, see Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers,
8 CLIN. L. REV. 33 (2001).
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quite captures his feelings. Like most clients, however, the client does
not hold the lawyer's inability to "mind read" (or "heart read")
against him. He corrects the lawyer by providing him with more infor-
mation. That information still emerges as a factual account rather than
a direct assertion of feelings. But the new facts-the client's hard work
and excellent evaluations-lead the lawyer more confidently to iden-
tify and label some of Braxton's feelings as anger and surprise. In ad-
dition, the client's cryptic and incomplete reference to having "gone
through" something, followed by a pause and then a statement about
lack of "support," suggest to the attorney the strength and color of the
client's emotions, despite the client's difficulty in speaking about
them.
Although active listening is a critical tool to underscore that you
are listening to your client, it is generally not seen by the novice as a
very natural or comfortable way to respond. The young attorney or
law student sometimes feels that it is difficult to come up with true
active listening responses and that the client will view his awkward
attempts as phoniness. Effective active listening responses are difficult
for many new interviewers to imagine or to formulate on the spot and
so require practice. While early and self-conscious efforts at active lis-
tening may have a feeling of "phoniness," it is our own view and expe-
rience that clients sense phoniness and can tell it apart from the
authentic feeling communicated by the lawyer regardless of how
smoothly or awkwardly she speaks. A sincere attempt to understand
the client's factual statement and feelings, no matter how stiff and
even off base, will usually be met with appreciation by clients for the
effort made by the attorney-even if the client ends up having to cor-
rect what you have said.
3. Other techniques for conveying empathy, sympathy, approval and
support
Powerful as active listening is, the lawyer also has other tools for
communicating regard for her client:
(a) Direct assertions can be valuable. You as the attorney can ex-
plicitly state your own feelings, reactions and intentions. The lawyer
might directly express empathy or sympathy; for example, attorney
Long might say to Mrs. Jackson, "I am sorry to hear about the dis-
tressing circumstances of your divorce." Or Anderson could say to
Braxton, "It is very frustrating to have worked so hard and not get
paid what is your due." Or the lawyer might offer a direct assertion of
what kind of support or help the attorney will give. Long or Anderson
could say: "Mrs. Jackson [Mr. Braxton], you can rest assured that I
will work my hardest to help you through this difficult time."
[Vol. 10:755
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Be careful of direct assertions such as "I can understand how [dif-
ficult, frustrating, etc.] this is," especially early on in a relationship.
Obviously you are doing your best to understand, but you need to
remember, objectively, that you are not in fact your client and her
circumstances are in fact different. Indeed, sometimes a client's back-
ground and circumstances will be quite unlike anything to which her
attorney has personally been exposed. Especially in these situations, it
is important to convey to your client your awareness that her situation
is different from yours and that you are listening intently to learn and
understand her particular facts, feelings and goals.
(b) Another technique to convey empathy, sympathy or support
is apology. Most often apology is used as a recovery technique. When
you, as the attorney, have inadvertently said something that angers or
distresses the client, you need to try to recover the trusting connection
that you had previously established. A natural way to do so is by apol-
ogizing for your mistake. 8 The language of apology may also double
as the language of sympathy when you the lawyer are not in any way
at fault, for example in attorney Long's statement to her client above:
"Mrs. Jackson, I am sorry to hear about the distressing circumstances
of your divorce."
Another technique that is also closely related to a recovery
method is explanation. As you would expect, explanation is simply
telling the client why you have made a statement or asked a question
or suggested a particular course of action. Young attorneys and stu-
dents especially are often inclined to ask clients lots of questions. Typ-
ically the questions are all excellent-that is, they directly relate to
acquiring information that will allow the attorney to assess which legal
doctrines will or will not be applicable. But clients are often confused
about such questions and can experience this process as indifference
to their concerns as they feel and understand them. Providing clients
with explanations can alleviate that sense of disconnection from the
questions of the lawyer and can build (or rebuild) sympathy and con-
nection. Explanation is also a good way to convey your respect for the
client's dignity and privacy.
(c) A technique that facilitates apology and even explanation is
nonresentfulness. If you need to use apology as a recovery technique,
you may feel defensive. (After all you were only doing your best and
you may feel it is your client who was unclear or confusing.) In gen-
eral, you should avoid expressing defensiveness or resentfulness; per-
haps more important, try not to fall into such feelings (but recognize
them if you do). Be mindful9 of the fact that your clients are typically
8 We offer examples of apologies below. See infra text pages 764-65, 776-78.
9 Cf. Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of
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in stressful situations; that is why they come to you. Even in transac-
tional work, a client who must close a big contract or deal can be upset
or anxious. You can be an easy target for outbursts. Attacks can feel
personal, especially to the new attorney who already harbors concerns
about his still awkward skills, and they can certainly be expressed in
painfully personal terms. But you should remember what the situation
is and try to avoid taking such statements as actual attacks on you.
As an example, in the Braxton case, it might be that Braxton
senses, rightly or wrongly, that since Anderson has a nice office and
an apparently successful practice, his walls decorated with degrees
from schools Braxton recognizes and admires, Anderson has had no
experience with injustice at work. Braxton's reaction might be more
likely if we imagine Braxton to be close in age to Anderson and to see
him as a peer who had excelled beyond what Braxton had dreamt of
for himself. In this situation, Anderson may unwittingly trigger
Braxton's bitterness at his attorney's success:
Li: Well, Mr. Braxton, it sounds as if with your work record and
evaluations you should be at the top of the pay scale. I can
understand how being overlooked in the pay and promotion
department could make you angry.
Cl: Can you, Mr. Anderson? You seem to have done very well
for yourself. Probably played football and were Mr. Big Man
on Campus starting from kindergarten. Can you really
understand what it's like for a guy like me? The kid the
jocks bullied until I was halfway through high school and my
parents moved to a new town. I don't think so. This was a
mistake for me to come here.
L2: Wait, Mr. Braxton, I am sorry for my choice of language.
Neither one of us knows enough about the other to make
assumptions. And I shouldn't have assumed too much. I
have been successful, yes. And since I came by that success
fairly, I believe everybody who works hard should get their
just deserts as well. That is why I believe that I can help you.
Please, tell me more about your situation so that I can begin
to understand.
Here Anderson has used the phrase "I can understand. . . ." and re-
ceived a hostile response. We have cautioned against the phrase for
just this reason (though clients can take offense or get angry without
such a prompt).
Anderson's response to Braxton illustrates nonresentfulness, as
well as techniques of apology, explanation and direct assertion. He
Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1 (2002).
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quickly apologizes, saying "I am sorry for my choice of language." He
goes on to acknowledge his mistake of "assum[ing] too much" in the
context of a gentle rebuke to his client, as he reminds Braxton that
"neither one of us knows enough...." He uses the technique of expla-
nation to clarify what his own values and views are, and to defuse his
client's suspicions. And then he makes a direct assertion of support,
stating that he can help the client and, by implication, that he is willing
to help.
Two points are important to flag here. First, successfully respond-
ing without resentment depends upon conveying sincerity. Anderson's
nonresentful response is highly contextualized: in other words, it is
contingent upon his tone and body language. If he in fact is resentful
and defensive, no amount of carefully constructed language will pre-
vent the client from sensing the underlying feeling. If you cannot keep
the resentment out of your voice, it may be wise to acknowledge your
own feelings directly. To pretend that you are not really angry when
you are may only encourage the client to feel that you are not truthful.
The client's suspicions about your true feelings may well undermine
his development of trust in you.
Second, even if Anderson has avoided defensiveness, he has in-
cluded in his response a gentle rebuke, and his doing so raises the
issue of how far the attorney should introduce his own feelings into an
interaction with a client that is designed to convey empathy and emo-
tional support. Should the attorney say "Neither one of us knows
enough about the other to make assumptions"? Doing so certainly is a
way of saying what many of us would want to say-in essence "Hey!
You are making a lot of assumptions about me and you don't know
me!" If the attorney can maintain a gentle and apologetic tone, this
articulation of a genuine and appropriate emotion that is responsive
to the client's outburst could be successful. The rebuke could express
the lawyer's genuine engagement in the interaction with the client and
her desire to establish a meaningful and respectful relationship. On
the other hand, right tone or wrong tone, the client could feel criti-
cized and fail to hear anything else the attorney has said.
(d) Another technique for conveying or maintaining empathy and
similar feelings is personal connection, or sharing. An attorney could
choose to share some detail in his life as a way of explaining his ability
to understand or empathize. Attorney Long, being a divorced woman
herself, might share that fact or some details of her own history that
appear to be similar to the client's. Or attorney Anderson may not
have been the popular sports figure Braxton imagines and could relate
his own experiences with bullying.
While the other techniques that we have described are essential
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and should be used, at appropriate points, by all attorneys, personal
disclosure is a matter of personal choice. Not all individuals will be
comfortable sharing personal information with a stranger. This truth is
part of what makes self-disclosure a powerful tool with clients if you
can wield it effectively. Clients often do not Want to have to tell you, a
stranger, their personal situation, mistakes, embarrassments and
problems. Your willingness to share can make the relationship feel
less imbalanced as well as underscore your ability to empathize or
sympathize with the client's situation. But the technique has its pitfalls
as well. When you are acting as someone's attorney-even if the client
in other circumstances is a personal friend of yours-the focus is not
on you and your problems, history or issues; there is no equal time as
one would expect with a friend. And you will need to maintain a cer-
tain boundary between you and your client so that you can deliver the
critical or negative assessments and information that are a routine
part of the lawyer-client relationship. Friends can avoid bad news-
rightly or wrongly. Lawyers cannot. Our choice is not whether to de-
liver it but how and when.
B. The Lawyer's Feelings of Difference and Connection
Building connection is by no means merely a matter of the law-
yer's employing particular techniques that elicit desired reactions
from the client. Some of the barriers to communication in lawyer-cli-
ent relationships come from the client-but some come from the law-
yer. Empathy must be accompanied by rigorous self-examination. You
surely will have clients whom you experience as "difficult," but part of
your response must always be to reflect upon yourself and your skills
and attitudes as a lawyer. The responsibility is on you, as the profes-
sional in the relationship, to do the self-analysis needed to recognize
and if possible overcome your contribution to the difficulties in the
relationship, and to focus your interactions with the client on his
problems and concerns.
Empathy, sympathy and approval raise key and complicated is-
sues around identification versus objectivity in your relationship with
your client. To empathize with a client and identify with her circum-
stances or cause can provide an energy and enthusiasm that can prove
invaluable in an attorney-client relationship. Most of the social justice
or civil rights movement attorneys shared (and do share) the passion
and perspective of their clients. The attorneys with the NAACP (Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People) Legal
Defense and Educational Fund who were instrumental in the
[Vol. 10:755
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landmark desegregation case of Brown v Board of Education1 ° were
as passionate about equality issues as their clients were, if not more
so. That kind of alliance with the client can be a benefit to the attor-
ney-client relationship; it can bolster the clients' morale and spirits
during long and difficult litigation.
Such alliances also can have drawbacks. Attorneys can "over-
identify" and assume they know exactly what the client wants or
needs. And an attorney could be perceived by the client as pushing
him to do things that he, the client, may not, or may no longer, want.
Harriet Long, as a divorced woman herself, may have had an experi-
ence so similar to her client's that identification with the client's feel-
ings of anger and betrayal comes quite easily. Betty Ann Jackson
could feel comforted to have an attorney who has "been there" and
who resonates with her feelings; the similarity of experience could
help her believe that her lawyer is truly a champion for her. On the
other hand, Long does have to have enough self-awareness to resist
assuming that she knows exactly how Jackson feels and that their di-
vorce situations are exactly alike.
Moreover, objectivity is vitally important. The empathetic attor-
ney must be wary of too complete an identification with the client.
You will need to step back from the client's situation, in ways that the
client often cannot, in order to provide the critical eye and assess-
ments that are part of your obligation to him.
In addition, there will, inevitably, be clients with whom the law-
yer does not readily identify-yet they too need faithful representa-
tion. Many clients have done things that their attorneys do not agree
with. The defense of any number of criminal defendants who kill,
rape, bomb or embezzle from others as well as the representation of
any number of civil defendants who manipulate stocks, massively pol-
lute the environment or manufacture unsafe products all depend upon
some attorneys being able to develop an attorney-client relationship
with people (and corporations) who have engaged in activity or who
hold attitudes with which the attorney cannot closely connect. In some
cases, the attorney will have to stretch to find a loose sympathy with
some aspect of the client's case, circumstances, personal background
or personality in order to make some kind of connection. You need to
avoid "under-identifying" with your client, because this distancing re-
lationship can lead to an unconscious unwillingness to do your best
and undermine your client's confidence and trust.
So, for example, Allen Anderson may have no experience with
failure at any job. He may not have had any personal experience of
10 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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discrimination or unfairness in the employment context. Strongly
identifying with Anthony Braxton may be difficult, but by imagining
what he might feel like if his hard work had not paid off as it had in his
past, Anderson could certainly find some measure of empathy or sym-
pathy for Braxton. What if it turned out that Braxton, contrary to his
self-portrayal to Anderson, is a lousy worker or even a dishonest one?
While this may make Braxton even harder to bond with, Anderson's
job as an attorney (and yours) is to stretch his abilities at sympathetic
understanding to at least appreciate the distress and fear that anyone
would feel at finding himself the lowest person on the ladder. This
connection may not be a close one, but it can sustain and help convey
the lawyer's support-his willingness to do his best to explore whether
the client might still have any case. And assuming that it turns out the
client does not have a case, the lawyer can and should remember and
even restate this kind of connection as he crafts a nonjudgmental de-
livery of the bad news that the law can't help the client given the facts.
These points can be generalized, for the lawyer's feelings of con-
nection to or distance from a client need not come only from her
feelings about the justice of the client's claims. You may encounter a
client and early on feel either "we have nothing in common" or "s/he's
just like me." Perhaps this feeling stems from physical repulsion-or
attraction. It could also be a response to a host of habits, personality
quirks or character traits that a lawyer could be extremely drawn away
from (or drawn to). Before deciding that it is all the client's fault, as
we have already said, an attorney needs to examine his own habits and
traits. You could be reacting because of your own issues. Only when
you recognize and acknowledge your reactions can you use effectively
the many techniques for establishing the kind of connection that is so
important in the attorney-client relationship.
While both too much attraction and too much distance are prob-
lematic, the feeling that "we have nothing in common!" may be a
more frequent source of difficulty. Besides recognizing it, what can a
lawyer do about it? One step we have already identified, in discussing
Anderson and Braxton, is to look for commonalities that might not be
readily apparent. Another straightforward step is to identify any and
all characteristics in the client that you can recognize as positive.
Think through how what appear to be negatives could be viewed as
positives. At the least, find an explanation for your client's apparently
negative behavior. Whether your client is a corporate CEO or a gang
leader, both could come off as arrogant and indifferent to others. You
don't have to "like" what either is or does to recognize that each of
these clients, whether dealing with hostile takeovers of corporate
stock or illegal drug trade routes, has to survive in environments
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where any show of weakness, such as concern for others, may be
viewed as a liability.
Connection and disconnection can also grow from differences
rooted in larger social or cultural background influences, or socially
constructed identity categories, that could make your perception of
the world quite different from your client's. You may feel that you
could never possibly understand your client because the two of you
differ so much in terms of gender, race, class, culture, religion, sexual
orientation, or citizenship status or other factors. Conversely, you may
feel that such differences have no impact at all on your interaction and
engagement with your client. Broadly, we think that these differences
do matter, and in ways that are complex and sometimes unpredict-
able, but that they are not ordinarily impassable barriers to lawyer-
client connection. As powerful as these factors are within society and
often within individuals, the lawyer's goal should be to acknowledge
them and then to work to overcome the barriers they may generate.
The responses that we have already discussed in the context of
other gaps between attorney and client may be useful in this context
as well. It is important to take the ancient expression "nothing human
is alien to me" seriously. We are all related as members of the human
race and family. Despite apparently vast differences, the few things
two people happen to have in common can make connection a breeze
-the Irish lawyer and Latino client, for example, may bond through
their shared Catholicism. Even if similarities are not immediately evi-
dent, with enough time and effort people generally can find
commonalities.
Discovering these connections necessarily may require hard work
and patience. Good intentions alone may not be enough. Educating
yourself about the experiences and lives of homeless people or men-
tally challenged people or people who are recent immigrants or peo-
ple from different racial or ethnic groups is often essential to
supplement your well-intentioned attempts to connect with people
who are different from you. The potentials, and pitfalls, can be seen if
we return to Harriet Long's interview of Betty Ann Jackson, and Al-
len Anderson's meeting with Anthony Braxton.
Harriet Long and Betty Ann Jackson, who have so far seemed to
find common ground, may in fact have major differences that could
interfere with their relationship:
Li: Hello, Mrs. Jackson, how can I help you?
Cl: Well, Ms. Long, my husband is about to run off with
someone young enough to be our daughter and I need help




L2: Mrs. Jackson, you have come to the right place for help in
family matters. And I have some sense of the difficulties of
going through hard times without the rest of your family.
Connecticut is a long way from my original home too.
C2: I am guessing Alabama, like me, from the sound of your
voice. I am from Birmingham.
L3: Yes. Birmingham for me too. Most of my family is still there.
So tell me more about your situation.
C3: I just can't believe it. I never thought I would be one of all
those many people getting divorced. When you think back to
when we were kids, marriages stayed together and life was
so much easier.
L4: Well, marriages did stay together. And certainly some things
were easier.
C4: Oh, oh, I didn't mean the whole Jim Crow thing. Or the
bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist church where those
little black girls were killed. I ....
L5: I know. Fortunately, some of that has changed. So tell me
about your situation. It sounds painful and I confess ... my
own ex-husband left me for his nurse after I put him through
Yale college and med school.
Here the fact that the two women are of different races could
prove an impediment to the attorney-client relationship. While we all
hope that these sorts of issues will not matter, too often they do con-
tinue to have some significance. The key for an attorney is to be able
to examine herself honestly to identify whether she is bringing some
hindering issue to the equation. Here, Long does not on the face of it
appear to have any racial bias toward whites, but her client's views on
what living in Birmingham, Alabama in the 1950's and 1960's was like
are drastically different from hers and very reflective of the different
experiences that blacks and whites had due to legalized segregation
and racial inequality. Here, Long consciously chooses to skirt around
their differences and instead focus in on the similarity that she recog-
nizes they share, a similarity she emphasizes with candid self-
disclosure.
It is striking that just as this situation could have deepened into
mistrust, it could also have led the lawyer to feel that her client was
"just like me!", if the lawyer's focus had been on the factors which
make the two women quite similar-and that sentiment too would
have missed the full complexity of their interaction:
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Li: .... Tell me about your situation. I confess ... my husband
left me for his nurse after I put him through Yale college
and med school.
Cl: What an animal! Did you have kids too? I have three to
raise and he is arguing about child support!
L2: I had two to raise. And part of the time he didn't give me a
dime. I had to fight him every step of the way. And won.
C2: You go gal.
L3: That's why I went to law school, to make sure no woman
and her children go through that. We will get that husband
of yours. He'll do right in the end. Trust me on that.
Here, Long, rather than having any concern about race, has thor-
oughly identified with her client because of the similarities of their
divorces. While this kind of empathy and identification can make a
client feel she has a champion, Long needs to be self-aware about the
possibility of over-identifying with Jackson. Jackson may be angry at
this point, but it is not at all clear that she wants (or should want) to
"get that husband of hers."
The encounter between Anderson and Braxton reflects that there
can be even more challenging divisions for lawyers searching for ways
to connect with their clients-despite profound similarities that lawyer
and client may also share:
Li: Hello, Mr. Braxton. Come in. Ah! I see I don't have to offer
you a chair since you like me have brought your own. Get
comfortable here.
Ci: Mr Anderson, I hadn't realized when I called to make an
appointment that you were in a wheelchair too. Call me
Tony.
L2: Tony it is and I am Al. And yes, I was the victim of a
shooting in my teens. Wrong place at the wrong time. But I
didn't let that stop me from finishing college and going on to
law school.
C2: I respect that a lot. I was in a car accident. I would have
been a pro football player but for it. I had been picked in
the draft and everything. But with a lot of prayer and help
from friends and family and God, I got through and have
recreated my life as a stock broker. I work for a large
company ... where I have had my troubles.
L3: My staff told me that this was an employment discrimination




C3: It's not that, Al. At least I don't think so. The head of our
firm is a born-again Christian. He is a member of Pat
Robertson's church, and he hates gays and lesbians. He
thought I was great, wheelchair and all, when I was hired
because he saw me as a church-going former football player.
Which of course is exactly what I am. But I am also gay and
when he found that out ... well, everything changed and my
work life became hell.
L4: Uh, well ... Mr. Braxton. I think it only fair to tell you that
I too am a member of Reverend Robertson's church. My
religious views on homosexuality are separate from my job
in helping you make sure that your boss follows the law.
Here Al Anderson starts out assuming that he and his client,
Tony Braxton, could identify very closely as physically challenged men
who, through faith, have overcome difficulties to create successful ca-
reers, only to discover that other differences-their different sexual
orientations and different moral and religious views on this-may
cause them to be quite distant. These differences alone may make An-
derson feel that Braxton is in the "we have nothing in common" cate-
gory, although clearly as a factual matter that is not true. Anderson
will have to think carefully and honestly about whether his religious
beliefs will allow him to zealously represent his client. And Braxton
will have to decide how comfortable he is with Anderson as his attor-
ney. On the one hand, Braxton may feel that Anderson will have
some greater insight into the defense, since he will have a special un-
derstanding of his boss' position, and Braxton may feel that that will
help his case. On the other hand, he must decide if he will feel com-
fortable with an attorney whose religious beliefs may cause the attor-
ney to think less of him as a person, and possibly not work as
diligently for him.
This aspect of the Anderson-Braxton relationship highlights the
reality that while lawyers can and should work to bridge differences
with their clients, they must also be prepared for the possibility that
some differences are unbridgeable. Just as Braxton may be unable to
trust Anderson, so Anderson may be unable to fully commit himself
to representing Braxton. Again, self-awareness and honesty are key.
Here, Anderson has not revealed the details of his religiously
based moral code other than to implicitly confirm that it views homo-
sexuality in some kind of negative light. Whether Anderson should
politely refuse to represent Braxton is highly contextualized-as the
specifics of any attorney-client relationship are. The key issue for the
lawyer is not what outside observers might conclude about the funda-
mental tenets of his church, but how Anderson understands whatever
those tenets are. While there may be some church doctrine that re-
[Vol. 10:755
Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyering
flects a disapproval of gay and lesbian people or homosexual behav-
ior, there probably are also tenets on the connection between all
people in the eyes of God and the primacy of love as a moving force in
one's life. How Anderson understands and balances these two broad
moral approaches will be decisive for his ability to represent Braxton.
If Anderson's disapproval of homosexual behavior means that he,
personally, dislikes anyone he discovers is gay or lesbian and feels a
discomfort with and disrespect for them, then he needs to let Braxton
find an attorney who can represent him with zeal. On the other hand,
Anderson, who is a civil rights attorney, may find that his religious
views are more focused on the aspects of brotherly love. He could
decide that their shared physical challenges and the ways in which
both men have relied on God and faith to succeed constitute a much
greater connecting force than their differences around their sexual
orientations.
C. An Illustration: Hearing the Client's Story at the "Problems and
Concerns" Stage
We close this discussion of building connection in context with an
illustration, from the "problems and concerns" stage of an interview.
As we envision the model of basic interviewing, the "problems and
concerns" stage is the first substantive stage of the interview, follow-
ing greetings and initially getting to know the client and preceding
learning what solutions the client may have in mind, exploring the
facts in detail, offering preliminary counseling, and closing the inter-
view. This is the stage at which you need your client to tell you exactly
what her problem is, how she feels about it and what other conse-
quences or concerns relate to it. While most clients will tell you some-
thing, most will not provide all the information that you need to help
them solve their problems. You are not yet doing detailed fact explo-
ration (that comes a little later), but you do need a sense of what
happened and what it has meant for the client.
Here is where your questioning technique and your understand-
ing of the kinds of feelings that could cause a client to feel hesitant
about sharing complete information, coupled with your knowledge of
how you as an attorney can contribute to your client's reticence, will
all be needed to encourage any particular client to provide you with
the information you need. Remember, too, that active listening is very
important at this time. And you need to stay open to all information.
Some clients will sum up their problems and concerns in a sentence;
others may go on... and on ... until you may have to intervene. In
either case, and every case in between, whenever the client first stops
talking do not assume that you know what happened! It is not yet time
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to start asking closed, or worse yet leading, questions. As always, this
is not an absolute rule. But too often lawyers start with leading ques-
tions far too early in the conversation. When they do so, they risk
closing off fruitful avenues of discussion and, even more damagingly,
leaving their client with the perception that these other areas do not
matter or should in fact be hidden.
In addition, in this stage as at every juncture in the interviewing
process, differences between the lawyer and client may arise that can
inhibit the communication that must take place for the lawyer to as-
certain her client's problems and concerns. You are, of course, always
"getting to know the client" as an interview progresses, and part of
what you may get to know is about difference, as in the following con-
versation, which takes place in the office of attorney Bryan Culbert in
Seattle, Washington, sometime in late November or early December
of 1999:
Li: (After greetings and small talk) Ms. Yamashita, how can I
help you?
Cl: Well, Mr. Culbert, I was arrested. It is an absolute outrage!
And frankly I may want to sue the Seattle police.
L2: I see. You have been arrested and feel that this was unjust.
Do you have a lawyer for the criminal matter? And by the
way, what were you arrested for?
C2: Destruction of property, assault, resisting arrest. I was
arrested near the World Bank meetings during the
demonstrations downtown. And the cops just went wild! I
don't have a lawyer for the arrest; that's why I came to you
but I want to sue as well. I mean what happened to the First
Amendment?
L3: Okay. Well, let's start with the criminal matter first since
that will move faster than any civil matter we might choose
to bring and, frankly, the outcome of the criminal case may
well affect our civil case.
C3: What?! You mean I can't sue the cops for beating me
because they made up these charges?
L4: No. But if we don't "beat" the criminal charges, so to speak,
while you can sue, a judge or jury may, I stress may, feel
that whatever injuries you suffered were within the officer's
line of duty because you assaulted him or her or were
destroying property. So we can sue, but our case is harder.
Remember there was a good deal of publicity around the
demonstrations opposing the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund economic policies in third world countries.
Some people already believe that the Seattle cops lost it with
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the protestors. And that will help us. But others think that
the protestors got out of line, but even here we can focus in
on you and your behavior and your right to protest
peacefully and be treated with respect and dignity regardless
of how others were behaving. But let's get back to the
criminal situation-you were arrested demonstrating against
the World Bank and the cops roughed you up. Tell me
exactly what you were doing in the demonstration when the
cops approached you and what they said and did.
C4: And here is my problem again! I was not demonstrating! I'm
a reporter for the local newspaper and I was trying to cover
the demonstrations. And I think they-the cops-refused to
believe that I was downtown after the curfew lawfully
because I am black, part black. They just wouldn't listen to
me. And when they finally allowed me to pull out my press
identification badge and it said "Yamashita"-my name-
they didn't figure I could be both black and Japanese and
American too for heaven's sake! And they hit me! And at
the station they put restraints on me and pepper sprayed me!
I wasn't violent and I could have died!
Here, our lawyer, Culbert, is confronted with a client who is quite
upset about her criminal case and the circumstances of her arrest.
Culbert immediately starts using active listening (L2); he mirrors his
client's statement of fact by restating the substance ("you were ar-
rested") and he identifies the feelings she expressed ("and you feel
that this was unjust"). His client, Yamashita, is so angry that she is
focused on a civil case rather than the more pressing criminal matter.
Culbert, in his attempt both to calm her down and to redirect her at-
tention to the criminal case, makes some logical assumptions about
what happened. If she was arrested during the demonstrations against
the World Bank and IMF policies, it's likely that she was participating
in the demonstrations. But in fact this didn't have to be the case. The
effects of demonstrations, and police action directed at them, can in-
volve local residents and bystanders as well as demonstrators (and this
was true in Seattle in 1999).
In this case, the logical but incorrect assumption has managed to
offend the client because, unbeknownst to the lawyer, the client feels
that the crux of her case rests on inappropriate stereotyping and racial
assumptions. You could imagine, too, that if Yamashita had not had a
legitimate reason for being out past curfew-if she was neither law-
fully working nor engaged in civil disobedience-the lawyer could
have missed an opportunity to explore what she in fact was doing out
on the streets. What if Yamashita were a drug dealer and was working,
but not lawfully so? Culbert's defense might still focus in on all the
Spring 2004]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
confusion of the Seattle demonstrations but if he had not asked his
client about her activities in an open and nonjudgmental manner, he
would not be prepared for any "surprises" about his client's history.
He would generally be better off if he explored carefully whether or
not his client really was on the street for the demonstrations rather
than making even plausible, but premature, assumptions. Having
made this mistake, however, he now must try to recover from it:
L5: Ms. Yamashita, I am sorry. I shouldn't have assumed. You
said First Amendment and I heard right to protest when
you were talking about freedom of the press. Both
important rights. Again I'm sorry. Let's back up. What were
you doing that night exactly?
C5: I was downtown at about 8 PM. It was after curfew but it
was clear there were protestors out and I wanted to ...
well, do my job. Observe what actions they were engaged
in. Maybe interview people. Some were obviously our own
homegrown petty criminals out looting, but some people
were mad and were able to tell me about their issues.
L6: And that means you were doing what.., walking or in a
car? On the streets or inside stores or what?
C6: I was walking. I had left my car so that I could really see
what people were doing. I did not go into any stores
because they were all closed. I just talked to people I saw
on the street.
L7: What happened right before the police approached you?
C7: I was talking with some people who were real protestors
when some other people came and broke a store window. I
was trying to call to my photographer who was with me but
way down the street. And then I started to shout to the
people going in. Saying things like, "What are you doing? Is
this part of your protest? How does breaking into a store
help your cause?" And then the police came.
L8: Did you say who you were as soon as you saw them?
C8: Why? I'm black so I have to identify myself as legitimate?
L9: No, but you were out past curfew and as you said, you
were near people who had broken into a store. The cops
could make an honest mistake given the heat of the
moment.
C9: Yeah, well .... I didn't see them right away. I was trying
to stop the looters from going in and the cops came from
behind and grabbed me and threw me to the ground. And
that is when I said "Hey! I'm a reporter! I'm not with
them!"
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L10: Did they hear you?
C10: Of course they heard me! I was screaming as one would if
your arms were twisted and you had been thrown down.
They didn't care!
L11: Okay, I'm sorry. I'm just trying to get a sense of what it
was like out there. And these are questions-how easily
able the cops were to hear you-that will come up and we
have to be ready for them. What did they say to you when
you said that you were a reporter?
C1i: Well there were two on me. One guy, the older one, was
saying "Shut up, bitch!" And the other guy was trying to
cuff me. The one who said shut up, hit me too. And I
screamed again that I was a reporter and the younger guy
pulled out my press badge which was on a chain around my
neck and started to say something like "It does say she's a
reporter" and the older cop said "what!" and looked at the
badge for ... less than a second and said "Yamashita! Her!
She stole that to sneak through. Take her and let's get her
friends." And then they took me to the police van.
L12: Did either of these officers hit you again or say anything to
you as they took you to the van?
From the conversations, we can tell that Yamashita is mixed race,
African American and Asian American, and we can infer that she
"looks" black. Culbert's race is unknown, but it is apparent that he is
not black. That is clear from Yamashita's reaction to his question
about identifying herself to the police (C8), a reaction whose heat sug-
gests that she does not feel she is talking to someone who can identify
with the problem of being presumptively perceived to be "up to no
good" rather than an "upright citizen." Had Culbert been African
American, he might have been able to ask the same question about
identifying herself without getting quite the same reaction of anger
and resentment. Then Yamashita might have assumed that he knows
law enforcement shouldn't be that way but that he himself has had to
endure such questions just to ensure his own safety when stopped by
the police. Context matters. But it is important to note that non-black
Culbert uses other skills in the face of his client's misunderstanding of
his intent. He freely apologizes for his initial mistaken assumption
about her involvement in the demonstration (L5), and apologizes
again for another question that annoys her, even though he thinks he
had a good reason for the question (Lii). And in each case he also
provides the legitimate explanation for his questions without resent-
ment. These kinds of reactions can go a long way in encouraging a
client, over time, to trust you even if your initial interactions have
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been less than ideal.
At the same time, Culbert is, appropriately, asking a number of
open-ended questions designed to elicit an initial account of
Yamashita's problem. At L5, he asks, "what were you doing?" At L7,
he continues, "What happened right before the police approached
you?" At L6, he asks, "And that means you were doing what... ?"-
though he finishes that sentence with additional, closed-ended ques-
tions (such as whether she was "walking or in a car"). He is prodding
and prompting his client but avoiding out-and-out leading questions
(on the lines of "You were walking, right?").
Culbert is also anticipating some questions that he will have to
probe because they will be at issue later-notably in his question at
L10 ("Did they hear you [say you were a reporter]?"). Although
these questions are important, they are premature. The goal in
"Problems and Concerns" is to be able to discern and articulate for
your client what her legal and non-legal problems and concerns are.
You should be able to describe your client's legal problem for her in
"layperson's" terms along with any social, political, moral or religious
concerns that the client has said or intimated might be involved. And,
ideally, you should be able to label the legal doctrinal area in which
the solution is likely to be found. You do not need yet, however, to
probe the facts in detail.
One of the problems with "jumping the gun" by beginning to ask
your client questions before you have clearly transitioned to Fact Ex-
ploration is that the client could misunderstand your point, as
Yamashita does with Culbert. If you wait and let the client tell her
story first, then she will say all that she needs to say and feel heard by
you. Also, since you will have an introductory and explanatory speech
for the Fact Exploration stage, you can prepare your client for ques-
tions that might sound as if you, her attorney, doubted her veracity. It
is not enough, as Culbert's experience reflects, to be a sensitive and
responsive person; it is also important, in building connection with a
client, to shape individual questions and overall interactions in ways
that foster trust. The work of building connection, in context, goes on
at every stage and in every aspect of the lawyer's interaction with her
client.
II. INTERVIEWING ATYPICAL CLIENTS
It may be difficult to work with clients, but a central implication
of the lessons we hope to teach about building connection in context is
that there are few "difficult clients." In general, the challenges clients
present to you are the challenges of finding ways to work effectively
and respectfully with people who, whatever their differences, are no
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more imperfect than you. Conveying empathy and support, identify-
ing your own hesitations and attractions, and planning individual
questions and interviews as a whole are all important to forming rela-
tionships with your clients, but when these skills are well practiced the
result, we expect, is that many seemingly difficult clients will turn out
to be both less difficult and more impressive. Contexts, however, vary
widely, and the skills required to engage with most clients may not be
enough with some. Thinking about the "atypical clients" is both a rec-
ognition of the true complexity of lawyers' roles, and a reminder of
the importance of attention to the techniques of building connection
in every case.
Here, the scene is in a law school clinic. Two third-year law stu-
dents, Nate Goldstein and Mary Thompson (both in their early 20's),
are handling their first case in a criminal defense clinic. Their client,
Roger Martinez, is a 35-year-old person with a mild intellectual disa-
bility.11 He is charged with misdemeanor theft (theft of property that
has a value of less than $300) based on an incident in which he and a
co-defendant, Michael Gregg, allegedly stole several items of fruit
from a Safeway supermarket. Other than these basic facts, the stu-
dents know very little about the case, which they have received on
referral from the local public defender's office. After receiving the
case, Nate Goldstein called the telephone number they had for Mr.
Martinez, which turned out to be that of a group home for people with
intellectual disabilities. Goldstein spoke to Martinez and they agreed
that the client would come in for an interview today. He asked Mr.
Martinez if he would be able to get to the law clinic offices, and the
client said he would get a ride from the group home house manager.
The law students wanted to meet with their clinical supervisor
11 We use the term "mild intellectual disability" instead of the more conventional "mild
mental retardation" because, increasingly, people with mental retardation and their allies
object to the latter term, which they associate with societal stigma. While no one alterna-
tive has replaced "mental retardation," some professional groups have adopted "person
with intellectual disabilities" as the best alternative, and we adopt that convention here.
See, e.g., 68 Fed. Reg. 52,401 (Sept. 3, 2003) (noting Executive Order changing name of
President's Committee on Mental Retardation to President's Committee for People with
Intellectual Disabilities, "reflect[ing] efforts to promote equality for people with intellec-
tual disabilities"). Another term sometimes used, "person with developmental disabili-
ties," is both over-inclusive (there are many developmental disabilities, such as cerebral
palsy or autism, that are not mental retardation), and under-inclusive (in that people with
mild mental retardation may not actually be considered to have a developmental disabil-
ity). See Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§ 15002 (8) (2003) (defining "developmental disability" as meaning, inter alia, a "severe,
chronic disability of an individual that- . . . (iv) results in substantial functional limita-
tions in 3 or more of the following areas of major life activity: (I) Self-care. (II) Receptive
and expressive language. (III) Learning. (IV) Mobility. (V) Self-direction. (VI) Capacity
for independent living. (VII) Economic self-sufficiency.").
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before the interview, as'was standard practice in their program, but
the supervisor was unavailable and told them to go ahead without
him. Part of the supervisor's rationale was that he knew Mary
Thompson had had some experience in working with people with in-
tellectual disabilities prior to attending law school. When the students
discussed who would conduct the interview, however, Goldstein said
he'd like to try his hand with beginning the interview, and Thompson
agreed to let him do so.
Mr. Martinez has now arrived and the interview begins:
Ll(Goldstein): Good morning, Roger. This is my partner Mary
Thompson. As you know, we asked you to come
in today to speak with us about your criminal
case. Did you have any trouble getting here?
Cl: No, the house manager gave me a ride. He knew
where your office was.
L2(Thompson): Great. That's terrific. We know this must be a
little scary for you.
C2: Uh-huh.
L3 (G): We also want to reassure you that if there's
anything you don't understand, we will try to
explain it to you. Have you ever been charged
with a crime before?
C3: I don't know.
LA (G): You don't know if you've been charged with a
crime?
C4: Well, I don't think I have.
L5 (G): OK, well let's just talk about this incident. Can
you tell us what happened?
C5: Well, Mike and I were hanging out near the
Safeway on 70th Avenue like we do a lot. Mike
said that Safeway were cheaters. They stole some
money from him. He was mad about it. Um...
(Martinez trails off).
L6 (G): Roger, you're doing great. Just keep going.
What happened next?
C6: Mike said he was going to get back at Safeway.
He asked me if I was willing to help him. I said
yeah, I would. So we went into the store and
went to where the fruit is. He put some apples
in his jacket. I did too. Mike then said, "Quick,
let's go," so we ran out of the store.
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L7 (G): Okay. So what happened after you left the
store?
C7: I don't remember.
L8 (G): Did you go anywhere? Did the police stop you?
C8: We just ran real fast. We went to the group
home. I went in the house and Mike went home,
I guess. Man, it was cool!
L9 (G): Did someone then arrest you?
C9: I don't know.
L10 (G): How did you know you were in trouble with the
police?
C10: What do you mean trouble with the police? I
didn't do anything wrong. (Mr. Martinez becomes
somewhat agitated.)
L1i (G): (With a somewhat frustrated tone) Look, Roger,
I didn't say you did anything wrong. But you've
been charged with theft and we need to ask you
these questions so we can defend you in the best
way possible.
L12 (T): (To Nate) Let me try something.
L13 (T): Mr. Martinez, do you know what "theft" is?
C11: Sure I do. I'm not stupid!
L14 (T): I know you're not stupid-that's obvious to
anyone who talks to you. But why don't you tell
me what you think the word "theft" means, just
so I can be sure you, Nate and I all understand
the same thing.
C12: I don't know how to say it exactly.
L15 (G): So you really don't know what "theft" means.
C13: I told you, I'm not stupid.
L16 (T): Actually, Mr. Martinez, a lot of people don't
know what that word means. Do you know what
"stealing" means?
C14: (Brightening) Sure! That's when you take
something from someone.
L17 (T): Has that ever happened to you, that someone




C15: Uh-huh. Like when Mary Kay stole my Beatles
CD at the group home. She said she didn't take
it but I knew she did. Larry helped me get it
back from her. I really like that CD.
L18 (T): That's exactly right. You really know your stuff.
Theft is just a fancy word for stealing. So in your
case, it's just like what happened with your CD,
only you are like Mary Kay and Safeway is like
you. And the fruit is the CD. Safeway is saying
that you took the fruit without their permission.
Just like you said Mary Kay took your CD
without your permission.
C16: But Mike said they were cheaters!
L19 (T): Let's talk a little more about that ....
Interviewing clients who are atypical in some way-such as
Roger Martinez, who is a person with mild intellectual disabilities-
can present particular challenges for both inexperienced and exper-
ienced attorneys alike. While there is no such thing as the normal
client (a term we specifically eschew) or typical client, it is undeniably
true that some kinds of clients require law students and lawyers to
vary the techniques you would usually employ in consideration of
your clients' special circumstances. 12 Those circumstances can reflect
cognitive limitations (as with Roger Martinez), age limitations (for ex-
ample, with child clients or elderly clients), or emotional or psycholog-
ical limitations (such as with clients with schizophrenia). Being an
effective interviewer in such cases requires consideration of ap-
proaches that must be adapted to the client's context.
In the law students' interview with Roger Martinez, there are a
number of contextual elements that come into play, and the students
demonstrate their appreciation of some of these and their lack of un-
derstanding of others. For example, at L1, Nate Goldstein's some-
what standard opening icebreaker of "Did you have trouble getting
here?" may be an especially useful inquiry in the context of a client
who might be expected to have more than the usual difficulty in fol-
lowing directions and getting to the law clinic office. Even though Mr.
Martinez had told Nate over the telephone that he would get a ride
from his house manager, making even such a seemingly easy arrange-
ment could have created difficulties for this client. Mary Thompson's
12 For an extensive critique of society's construction of difference with respect to disa-
bility, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990).
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follow-up at L2 with an active listening response is also well-timed to
put the client at ease, even if it does not apparently elicit a significant
response. Goldstein's reassurance to the client, at L3, that he will ex-
plain anything the client does not understand, and his open-ended
question at L5, are again standard things to say to a client but particu-
larly important here.
But if the interview starts well in some respects, it clearly breaks
down in others. Goldstein chooses to start the interview by addressing
the client by his first name. Would he have done so if his 35-year-old
client (who was older than both the students) had typical intelligence,
or is the familiarity a subtle form of infantilizing the client? At the
least, Goldstein might have asked the client's permission to address
him by his first name. Note that when Thompson addresses the client
(at L13), she refers to him as Mr. Martinez. Goldstein's use of Mr.
Martinez's first name may also be problematic to the extent it sug-
gests, or at the least plays into, stereotypical interactions between
white people and people of color, in which the former refer to the
latter by first names even when age difference would suggest a more
deferential form of address.13
As the interview proceeds, a dynamic develops in which the client
seems not to understand what Goldstein is getting at, or the terms that
he is using. Mr. Martinez reacts sharply to Goldstein's imputation of
his wrongdoing, at C10, and Goldstein's reaction at L1i reflects his
frustration with the client's inability to help him with the factual back-
ground of the case. (It's not so clear, though, that Mr. Martinez's reci-
tation of events, including those portions where his understanding is
vague, is really very different from the knowledge of many clients
charged with similar low-level crimes.) Thompson's intervention, at
L13, is clearly crucial. Rather than assuming Mr. Martinez's knowl-
edge, she asks him to explain what he knows. She then skillfully han-
dles Mr. Martinez's anger at being called, implicitly, "stupid," by
reassuring him that many people do not understand legal terms (after
overcoming Goldstein's boorish interjection), and, most importantly,
by substituting a term ("stealing" for "theft") that the client might be
more likely to understand. Mr. Martinez's reaction reflects his sense
of empowerment, if not outright joy, at being able to demonstrate his
knowledge to his attorneys.1 4
13 Of course, we have not told you what race or ethnicity Nate Goldstein and Mary
Thompson are. Nate's last name would probably suggest he is Jewish (at least ethnically if
not religiously), though Mary's last name provides fewer clues.
14 Mary Thompson's comment at L14 that it is "obvious to anyone" that Mr. Martinez
is not stupid may, of course, be stretching the truth regarding how others might perceive
the client as a person with cognitive limitations. But in this context, it seems not only to be
a supportive intervention designed to create (or re-establish) rapport, but also one calcu-
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But Thompson goes further, at L17 and L18, by asking him to
analogize his crime to his prior experiences. In this way, she is asking
the client to engage in higher-order thinking than he has so far exhib-
ited. That thinking may well lead to understanding that will make fur-
ther interaction in the case much smoother. Indeed, it could inform
later decisions about Mr. Martinez's capacity to understand the case
and take the stand if the case is tried.
In cases like this one, it is critical that you not assume that the
client lacks capacity to tell his story or make decisions merely because
he is labeled as having an intellectual disability. Not only is the pre-
sumption of client capacity required by a decent respect for the cli-
ent's autonomy, 15 but the ethical rules require it as well. Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(a), on "Clients With Diminished
Capacity," states:
When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of
minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client. 16
To be sure, this formulation of the lawyer's responsibilities begs a
number of questions 17 (including what is meant by a normal client-
lawyer relationship), but it at least requires you as a lawyer to justify
deviations from what you would consider the usual or standard law-
yer-client relationship that you generally adopt. Moreover, the Com-
mentary to the Rule points out, quite correctly, that capacity is not an
all-or-nothing concept but rather exists on a continuum, and that even
a client with diminished capacity "often has the ability to understand,
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the cli-
lated to elicit additional factual information. It also puts the law student on the side of the
client by depicting her as one who does not accept the stigma that attaches to people with
intellectual limitations.
15 See Stanley S. Herr, Capacity for and Consent to Legal Representation, in A GUIDE
TO CONSENT 77 (Robert Dinerstein, Stanley S. Herr & Joan O'Sullivan eds., 1999).
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a) (2000). The revised Rule 1.14,
part of the Ethics 2000 Commission revisions to the Model Rules, substituted the term
"diminished capacity" for "disability," "disorder," or "competence," terms which appeared
in the original Rule 1.14. The Reporter explained that the change in terminology was
meant to reflect more accurately the notion of capacity existing on a continuum. It is
unfortunate, however, that the term "diminished capacity" has a different meaning in a
criminal law context that might sow confusion when used in Rule 1.14.
17 See Paul Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. RyV. 515; Stanley S. Herr, Representation of
Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
609 (1989-90). For discussion (and criticism) of the role of counsel for clients with mental
disabilities, see Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of
Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1992).
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ent's own well-being."' 8
The law students' partial interview of Mr. Martinez, with its posi-
tive and negative aspects, does demonstrate some important charac-
teristics of clients with mild cognitive impairments. First, research has
shown that such individuals respond well to open-ended questions or
"open, free recall questions."' 9 Closed questions elicit more details
from these clients, but the level of inaccuracy is higher than it would
be for people without cognitive limitations. Leading questions, espe-
cially when designed to be confusing (as they might well be, in cross-
examination), are especially likely to lead to inaccurate recall. The
reasons why people with intellectual disabilities in particular are more
susceptible than others to suggestive questioning are complex, 20 but
appear related to lower mental capacity, a heightened desire to please
the interviewer/questioner, and the phenomenon of "passing"-trying
to hide one's mental retardation by feigning knowledge so as to avoid
admitting not knowing something one thinks one should know.2 1 Mr.
Martinez's reactions in the above dialogue at Cll and C13 reflect his
sensitivity about appearing not to know something he thinks he
should.
That Mr. Martinez's case arises in a criminal context raises other
important issues. In addition to the inevitable concern with whether
the client "did anything wrong," which certainly was an issue for Mr.
Martinez (C10), the client arguably finds himself in trouble criminally
because of his too-ready willingness to follow the lead of his friend
Michael Gregg. That suggestibility and lack of judgment, often consti-
tutive of mild intellectual disabilities, may play a salient role in the
ultimate defense or negotiation of this case.22 Moreover, though not
18 MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.14 cmt. [1].
19 The discussion in this paragraph is based on several sources, including Nitza B. Perl-
man et al., The Developmentally Handicapped Witness: Competency as a Function of Ques-
tion Format, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 171 (1994), and Mark R. Kebbell & Chris Hatton,
People with Mental Retardation as Witnesses in Court: A Review, 37 MENTAL RETARDA-
TION 179 (1999).
20 See, e.g., W.M.L. Finlay & E. Lyons, Acquiescence in Interviews with People Who
Have Mental Retardation, 40 MENTAL RETARDATION 14 (2002) (while acquiescence by
people with mental retardation to yes-no questions is a function of a desire to please or
submissiveness, it also may be a product of questions that are overly complex either in
grammatical structure or in the type of judgments they seek).
21 See ROBERT B. EDGERTON, CLOAK OF COMPETENCE: STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF THE
MENTALLY RETARDED (1967; rev. ed. 1993).
22 For a general discussion of the lawyer-client relationship with a client with mental
retardation in a criminal case, see Robert D. Dinerstein & Michelle Buescher, Capacity
and the Courts, in A GUIDE TO CONSENT, supra note 15, at 95. See generally Christopher
Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty to Clients with
Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581 (2000); James A. Cohen, The Attorney-Cli-




apparent in the interview excerpt presented here, defendants with
cognitive limitations may present issues of competency to stand trial
of which the attorney will need to be aware.
Some of the most interesting work on interviewing focuses on the
difficulties of, and techniques for enhancing, eyewitness testimony.
Investigators have developed the concept of the "cognitive interview"
to assist people with questionable capacity (and others) in recalling
events they have observed. 23 Although the earliest use of the cogni-
tive interview was in the context of police interviews of adult eyewit-
nesses to crimes, experts have adapted it for use with children
(including children who may have been abused) and people with cog-
nitive limitations.24 The cognitive interview focuses on the impor-
tance of concentrating the interviewee's limited mental resources on
the task at hand; re-creating the context of the events sought to be
recalled; encouraging the interviewee to engage in "extensive and va-
ried retrieval" of memories; using "multiple coding and guided im-
agery" in remembering events in different ways; and using witness-
compatible questioning.2 5 The cognitive interview proceeds in stages
that look very much like those of an interview of a conventional or
typical client: "(a) the introduction; (b) open-ended narration; (c) the
probing stage, during which the interviewer guides the witness [inter-
viewee] to exhaust the contents of memory; (d) a review stage, during
which the interviewer checks the accuracy of notes about the inter-
view and provides additional opportunities to recall; and (e) the clos-
ing."'2 6  The principles of cognitive interviewing bear on all
interviewing, 27 and careful application of this approach-or of analo-
gous ones such as the "structured interview" 28-may be particularly
23 See, e.g., RONALD FISHER & R. EDWARD GEISELMAN, MEMORY ENHANCING TECH-
NIQUES FOR INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW (1992).
24 See DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHIL-
DREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS 83-84 (1998); Kebbell & Hatton, supra note
19, at 181-82.
25 POOLE & LAMB, supra note 24, at 84-86.
26 Id. at 87. See also FISHER & GEISELMAN, supra note 23, at 145-57 (on the "Sequence
of the Cognitive Interview").
27 See STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING
SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS
73-77, 85-88 (2d ed. 2003).
28 See POOLE & LAMB, supra note 24, at 92-94. Poole and Lamb note that the cognitive
interview may not be appropriate for young children of 7 or 8 years old, who may interpret
the repeated probing and multiple requests for recall as indicating that somehow they have
not given the correct answer and need to change it. Id. at 89. They write that the struc-
tured interview, developed by researchers in Germany and the United Kingdom, "mimics
the Cognitive Interview in all but a few special respects." Id. at 92. For example, the struc-
tured interview may dispense with context reinstatement, "report everything" instructions,
image probing, and "recalling in reverse order." Id. (reporting on study). Despite these
differences, however, "[t]he Structured Interview thus parallels the Cognitive Interview by
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fruitful with clients of limited capacity.
While the interview of Roger Martinez raises issues regarding the
capacity of people with mild intellectual disabilities, other kinds of cli-
ents-children, adolescents, elders, clients with mental illness or emo-
tional disturbance-may present special considerations as well. It is
critical for you to recognize the role that these clients' "differences"
may play in how you conduct the client interview without assuming
that there is a bright line between "atypical" and "typical" client inter-
viewing. Nor should you assume that a "one size fits all" approach
will work for all clients within the same category of difference. These
categories of difference or atypicality themselves contain wide varia-
tions within, as well as between, categories.
Many of the concerns that drive the model of interviewing we
present in this book-the importance of context and difference, the
value of the lawyer-client relationship, the significance of client-
centeredness-are just as valid for atypical clients as for others. The
differences may lie more in the need for you to make some adjust-
ments in technique, or in the recognition that many atypical clients
have multiple people in their lives (family members, other profession-
als) who may seek to play a role in the lawyer-client relationship you
set out to establish. These other people can be helpful, even essential,
to the client's well-being and full participation in the lawyer-client re-
lationship, but you must always remember that it is the person with
cognitive limitations (or other aspects of atypicality) who is the client
and who gets to decide (if he or she can) the role that these other
people play in his or her life.
III. ENGAGING IN MORAL DIALOGUE
In examining interviewing and counseling, we hope both to pro-
vide students with overall frameworks to guide their interactions with
clients and to illuminate complex questions, often wholly or partly
ethical questions, that students and lawyers need to address as they
move from their first lawyering experiences toward greater levels of
expertise and stronger engagement with clients. Part II of this article
ends with the principle of client control, and Part III begins in the
same place. One of the persistently difficult questions in the area of
counseling is whether lawyers should sometimes go beyond helping
clients to think through problems for themselves, to add their (the
lawyers') advice about what the clients should do. Perhaps the starkest
of such interventions comes when lawyers offer not just advice about
emphasizing rapport, allowing witnesses to guide interactions, recommending open-ended




what the smart move for the client may be, but also their moral views
on what it is ethically right for the client to do. In these cases, lawyers
are relying on, or attempting to assert, a connection with their clients
that is particularly intimate, or perhaps particularly intrusive. Whether
to do so is a question, as we shall see, both of ethics and of skill; in-
deed, skill in this area is itself a matter of ethics. In the excerpt that
follows, we look closely at a dialogue in which the lawyer offers moral
(and other) advice, focusing first on when moral advice is permissible
and second on how it should be given when the lawyer does decide to
give it.
Richard Mathiessen is a 50-year-old divorce lawyer, with 25 years
of experience in the field. For several months he has been represent-
ing Bill Arnholtz, a 35-year-old engineer whose wife has left him for
another man. They have quite a bit in common (both are white, Prot-
estant and fairly well off) and, as it happens, they have gotten along
well, among other reasons because both are avid golfers and members
of the same country club. It has been clear to Mathiessen for some
time that the marriage is irretrievably over, and Arnholtz's wife has
now filed for divorce. Her lawyer, another experienced practitioner in
the midsize city in which they live, has contacted Mathiessen to begin
negotiating the terms of the divorce, since both parties have told their
respective lawyers (and each other) that they want to handle this pro-
cess as amicably as possible. Although they have talked about what
Arnholtz would like to see in a settlement, those conversations were
more exploratory than concrete, and so Mathiessen has asked
Arnholtz to come in so that they can talk these matters over in detail.
Arnholtz arrives precisely on time, and Mathiessen comes out to the
office reception area to meet him and bring him back to Mathiessen's
office, where they'll have their meeting:
Li: Bill, it's good to see you again. How have you been doing?
Cl: Oh, man, I've been terrible. I can't get to the golf course at
all with this rain we've been having!
L2: (As they enter Mathiessen's office) I know. It's a disaster.
But otherwise are you okay?
C2: Oh, I've been all right, I guess.
L3: It's tough, huh?
C3: It's really tough. I still can't believe she left me for that
jerk, you know.
L4: I understand.
C4: And I'm like, lying awake at nights, re-running all the
things we said to each other, and wondering how I could
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have missed the clues.
L5: Bill, I think it's going to be hard for you to get anywhere
with thoughts like those, you know...
C5: Yeah, yeah, I know. I really know. My therapist says the
same thing. But I can't help it. And when I'm not thinking
about that I'm dreaming of having a chance to show this
guy what a wreck he's made of my life-or maybe just to
punch him out.
L6: Well, Bill, I really do understand your wanting to punch
this guy out, but (smiling) as your lawyer I can't advise you
to take that course of action.
C6: You know I'm not that kind of guy anyway.
L7: I do know it, and I respect the way you've been doing
everything you can to deal with this in the best and most
adult way possible. These things are never fun, but I've felt
good about working with you because you haven't ever
made it worse than it had to be. I've had some clients who
I just couldn't say that about .... Which actually brings me
to the business we need to do today, which is to talk about
what you want to get in the separation agreement. Have
you had a chance to think about that?
C7: Yes, I have. I had a long talk with a good friend of mine,
who's been through this himself, and that really helped me
sort out what I wanted to do.
L8: So: we've talked about the two basic issues that every
divorcing couple with kids have to deal with, and hopefully
will deal with in a responsible way-money and custody-
and you told me your initial feelings about both. Now that
you've had a chance to think some more and to talk to
your friend, what are your thoughts about these today?
C8: Basically this: I don't want her to do this to me and then
make a profit from it too.
L9: I understand that feeling, Bill, but I'm not sure I know
what you mean, concretely, as far as her not making a
profit is concerned.
C9: Well, you know all that law you told me about, that the
courts see marriage as a partnership and basically say that
each partner is entitled to an equal share of all the results
of the partnership? Well, it seems to me that in a
partnership if one partner is cheating on the other and the
partnership breaks up, the cheater doesn't get half of what's




L10: Bill, that is right-in commercial partnerships. But our
state's law is very clear that what they call "marital fault"-
the fact that one spouse or the other was a bad spouse and
even was the cause of the divorce-isn't relevant to the
settlement of the money issues in a divorce.
C10: Well, if you mean to tell me now that there's no alternative
to a straight 50-50 split, why didn't you say so in the first
place?
L1i: Bill, I know you're upset, but that's not like you to jump to
conclusions that way. That's not at all what I'm saying.
What I am saying is that if this divorce goes to trial-and I
know you've told me, very clearly, that you don't want that,
because it would only make things harder for everyone-
then it would be difficult for us to avoid a 50-50 split. From
what you've told me, you and your wife both worked full-
time or almost full-time, and you both contributed
significantly to the joint income of the family ...
Cl: I contributed twice as much as she did, you know that.
L12: Yes, I do, but her one-third would still be considered
significant. Plus you both brought roughly the same assets
to the marriage. And you have two kids, who have to be
supported in whatever parent's home they live in.
C12: My friend says that if we settle out of court we can go quite
a ways away from 50-50.
L13: Yes, that's right and I was about to talk about that. If we
settle, as I know you want to-so that no one has to go
through the expense and pain of a trial-then probably the
judge will approve the agreement we make, even if it's not
50-50. The courts assume that, at least within a certain
range, the divorcing couple knows best.
C13: So that's what I want to do. I want to settle, and I want the
settlement to give my wife-I'm sorry, but this is how I
feel-as little money as possible.
L14: Bill, you're entitled to feel that way, and you don't need to
apologize to me for it. My job is to help you accomplish
what you feel you want, as far as it can be accomplished.
C14: So how far can this be accomplished?
L15: Well, that depends first of all on who's going to have
custody of the kids. Whoever has custody has to have
enough money to support the kids, and the courts are
pretty vigilant about that. The last time we spoke I thought
you felt pretty clear that the kids would need to be
primarily with their mother. Did I get that right?
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C15: Yes. It has to be her, really. You know I travel 3 or 4 days
a week for my job, and I have no one else to take care of
them.
L16: So we have to include in our offer enough money for her to
take care of the kids.
C16: Not from what my friend tells me.
L17: I'm not sure I see where you're going. What exactly did
your friend tell you?
C17: He said that the way to make her back off on the money is
to threaten to fight about custody.
L18: You mean, to tell her that we're going to press for custody
even though you don't actually want custody?
C18: Yes, exactly.
L19: (Pause)
C19: Are you going to tell me there's something wrong with
that? I don't see how there can be. If I'd broken my leg,
and suffered $50,000 of damages, it wouldn't be wrong for
me to start negotiating from $250,000, would it? I mean,
doesn't that happen every day?
L20: Yes, that happens a lot, of course.
C20: And it's not as if I'd have no chance of getting custody if I
did make a fight of it. I mean, she's had her problems as a
mother, like I've told you, and if I had to I could always
hire a nanny or an au pair or something to take care of
them when I'm away.
L21: Tell me again what her problems as a mother were, would
you?
C21: She had a nervous breakdown when our little one was a
year old, and from then on she was in twice-a-week
therapy. And for a while she had a drinking problem. I'm
not saying she was a bad mom, not at all-and I'm not
saying I was all that great a dad-but I could make a fight
of it, don't you think?
L22: (Quietly) You could make a fight of it.
C22: And if I did, that would be pretty likely to make her want
to come down on all the money issues, wouldn't it?
L23: Some people can be scared easier than others; I don't know
how easily your wife would scare.
C23: Well, let's be frank. I know it would kill her to lose custody
of the kids. I think she'll scare.
L24: Bill, there are a lot of things I could say to you about this.
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I'm not so sure she'll scare-remember, she has a lawyer
too, and I do know that lawyer, and she doesn't scare very
easily. And I know what threats lead to, and so do you-
they lead to fury as much as fear. Hell hath no fury, Bill,
hell hath no fury like this. She'll try to scare you back, and
you'll maybe think of some other way to scare her even
worse, and before you know it the two of you might even
be in trial after all-maybe you won't get this divorce done
for years.
C24: No, no, no, that wouldn't happen. I would never let it go so
far.
L25: I wish I could share your confidence, but I've seen these
things go from bad to worse more times than I like to think
about. I know one couple who spent eleven years litigating
their divorce. It became their drug, Bill, their addiction. By
the time it was all over, there was nothing left to divide
up-and the husband had a terminal illness. But maybe you
will still settle it. Do you think the anger will go away?
How long will your wife have to think about how you
scared her into taking a bad money settlement, after this is
over? Your kids are how old, 5 and 7?
C25: Yeah.
L26: So she'll have, oh, 15 years to think about this every day
while she's trying to manage her life, and take care of the
kids, on whatever you've agreed to let her have. She won't
suffer in silence, Bill. What effect do you think that will
have on how you and she deal with each other, and on your
kids?
C26: All right, I hadn't thought about that. Maybe I need to give
this some more thought.
L27: I really hope you will.
C27: But you're really coming on strong here, and I guess I want
to make sure of one thing: if I come back and say, yes, this
really is what I want to do, I know the risks and all and
I've decided I can handle it, you will do it for me, won't
you?
L28: Why don't we not cross that bridge till we come to it, Bill?
There are some complicated issues of legal ethics here,
frankly, and if we have to deal with them I'll explain them
to you, but frankly, Bill, I don't think you're going to come
back here and tell me that this is what you want to do. I
have too much respect for the way you've handled yourself
up till now to think that you're going to let the upset you're
feeling affect your judgment this way.
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C28: I don't get it. How can you say you respect me and at the
same time not promise to help me do what I decide I want
to do, as long as it's legal? I mean, if this is illegal I don't
want any part of it, but it isn't, is it?
L29: No, Bill, I don't think it is. But it is something that a lot of
lawyers just won't do, and I'll tell you why, so you don't
think I'm speaking this way because I'm against you or
anything like that. I have a lot of respect for you, Bill, and
I think this conversation is just a bump in the road and that
we'll look back on it someday and smile. The lawyers I'm
thinking of-and I consider myself one of them, Bill, and
I've been proud to work on your case because I think
you're this sort of person yourself-we feel that even
though in most negotiations and on most issues it's fair to
play a very hard game of hardball, that isn't true when kids
are at stake. Even if it would save you money, and you
know I'm not at all sure it would, even then it would just
be wrong. The parent who has custody of your kids needs a
fair money settlement to take care of them, and even more
important the kids need parents who aren't at each other's
throats. If you go down this road, you risk harming your
kids, and that's a risk I probably wouldn't be prepared to
take on your behalf. I'm not deciding this for myself right
now, because you might come back and show me some
aspect of all this that I haven't thought about yet or
understood properly, but right now, Bill, right now, my
answer would be that I'd have to resign from your case if
you insist on going this route.
C29: Wow. I didn't think lawyers said things like that to their
clients.
L30: Well, they don't, usually. But sometimes they do, when
what's at stake is something like children.
C30: I guess I've got a lot of thinking to do. But you know that
when I'm done thinking, I may be looking for another
lawyer.
L31: Yes, Bill, I understand that. I think we've worked well
together up till now, and I'd like to continue with you, but
if you want to get another lawyer, you certainly have that
right, and I wouldn't stand in your way.
A. The Morality of Moral Dialogue
Dialogues like this one may be quite unusual in actual legal prac-
tice. In many situations, lawyers who contemplate beginning such dia-
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logues will hesitate because of their own fear of losing clients,
including clients who can tarnish the lawyers' reputation or otherwise
injure their business. Ideally, lawyers will rise above their own inter-
ests in such situations when they must-but "when they must" is far
from "always," and we do not question that lawyers should consider
their own well-being as well as the well-being of the people their cli-
ents seek to injure when they decide whether or not to begin such
dialogues. We suspect that many lawyers faced with such dangers find
ways to accomplish what they see as morally required through the
process of counseling about legal obligations and practical conse-
quences-and we do not quarrel with approaching moral concerns ob-
liquely, by focusing on such practical considerations, when it is
feasible and so long as the discussion of practical considerations is it-
self accurate.
We also fully recognize that in many cases where lawyer and cli-
ent may not be of one mind, the lawyer will not feel that the moral
stakes justify the kind of intervention reflected in this Part's dialogue.
In many cases it may be perfectly legitimate for such lawyers to follow
their clients' implicit lead and say nothing at all about morality. In
other cases, lawyers might reject complete silence but see their role,
quite appropriately, as limited to assisting their clients to clarify their
own thinking (by asking, for example, whether the clients have consid-
ered any moral issues that their plans might suggest). Lawyers might
also offer moral comments that stick to suggesting to the client conclu-
sions that might follow from the clients' own moral beliefs as the cli-
ents have already articulated them-rather than adding the lawyers'
moral views as well. All of these approaches, along with the effort to
achieve moral results through appeals to client self-interest, have their
place.
We focus, however, on the possibility that sometimes more is ap-
propriate as well. This section of our book will examine the justifica-
tions and the methods of conducting such moral dialogues-
counseling conversations in which you invoke morality, rather than
solely law or the client's pragmatic self-interest, in an effort to per-
suade a client to make a particular decision.
There are strong arguments both for and against such dialogues.
The most powerful argument in their favor is the most obvious: other-
wise wrong will be done. The most powerful reason not to enter such
dialogues is equally clear: you may violate the client's right to choose
for himself. But neither of these arguments is as self-evidently valid as
it might at first appear. To say that "wrong will be done" is to assume
that your view of what is right and wrong is correct, and it may not be.
Lawyers have no monopoly on wisdom, and no immunity from bias,
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self-interest and limited perspective. Here, it is easy to share Mathies-
sen's disapproval of the custody threat tactic, which seems brutal and
discriminatory. Yet it has to be recognized that divorce negotiations
are inevitably focused on custody and money, and it is hard to imagine
negotiations that do not involve pressure on each of these fronts, po-
tentially from either spouse.29
Similarly, to say that the client's right to choose will be violated
assumes that clients do not want to think about morality, or at least do
not want to hear their lawyer's views while they do so. But why should
we assume that clients are indifferent to morality? On the contrary, it
is a form of respect for another person to assume that he or she is a
moral person who will want to take these considerations into ac-
count. 30 Your intervention may be initially unwelcome, but at least if
you handle the discussion sensitively many clients faced with difficult
moral choices may come to appreciate your words. Moreover, your
decision not to discuss morality, if that is the choice you make, may
also affect the client, by encouraging him to believe that he can act
without regard to moral constraints. 31
The moral calculus suggested by these cross-cutting arguments is
not easy to resolve. The rules of professional ethics reflect this diffi-
culty, and do not eliminate it. The Model Code tells us that "[a] lawyer
should bring to bear the fullness of his [or her] experience" in counsel-
ing the client, but does so only in an Ethical Consideration rather than
a Disciplinary Rule.32 The Model Rules make clear that moral consid-
erations are appropriate subjects for counseling, but stop short of re-
quiring lawyers to address these considerations. 33 The Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers is similar.34 The Model Rules and the
Restatement also authorize lawyers to withdraw from cases out of
29 See In re Marriage of Lawrence, 642 P.2d 1043, 1049 (Mont. 1982) (for the court to
"conclude that a separation is violative of public policy if one of the parties threatened a
custody fight in order to gain in the property distribution .... would not be based on any
kind of a realistic understanding of preagreement negotiations"). Scott Altman has re-
ported that both husbands and wives employ "pressure to trade custodial time for financial
terms," though husbands, it seems, resort to it more often. Scott Altman, Lurking in the
Shadow, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 501-04 (1995).
30 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1088 (1976).
31 See Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S.
TEX. L. REV. 181, 188-92 (1999).
32 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1983).
33 MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 2.1 (2003). It is possible to read the comment to
this Rule as declaring a duty to give moral advice in certain circumstances, but the lan-
guage of the Rule itself is permissive rather than mandatory.
34 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(3) (1998). Under the Re-
statement such advice is required, if competent and diligent lawyers in similar circum-
stances would provide it. See id. cmt. h, citing id. § 52 ("The Standard of Care").
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moral disagreement with their clients, and the Model Code authorizes
this as well, though perhaps not as widely-but none of these rules
compels lawyers to withdraw for these reasons as long as the lawyers
are still able to vigorously represent their clients.35
The rules' hesitancy is not improper. What the rules do is, we
think, what must be done-namely to leave the extent of moral coun-
seling that lawyers undertake to be decided, usually, by each lawyer,
and in each case. Moral dialogues are permitted, rather than man-
dated or forbidden, and so it is up to each lawyer to resolve the moral
calculus. We ourselves have somewhat different responses to this
problem, but we offer the following general guidelines that we hope
will assist you in addressing it for yourselves. In our book, we will
discuss these in more detail; here, we set them out only briefly.
The moral stakes: The case for a moral dialogue will be stronger
the greater the moral issue at stake.36
The debatability of the issue: The clearer your conviction about
what is morally required in the situation, the more willing
you should be to intervene. We recognize the paradox im-
plied by this guideline: A true dialogue is one in which both
parties are open to change, but in the relatively infrequent
cases where a lawyer following our guidelines would feel
called upon to intervene morally, a lawyer convinced the is-
sues are not debatable may be far from open to change. We
must accept the probability of non-dialogic dialogues, and
reckon it as one of the flaws of such interactions.
The client's capacity: The more able the client is to make an inde-
pendent judgment, the more appropriate it is for you to urge
your moral views.
The presence of shared values: Lawyers and clients rarely have
relationships so intense or so longstanding that the lawyer
can "convert" the client. We mean "convert" partly in its re-
ligious sense-the law office is no place for a lawyer to press
her religious views on a client, however much those views
seem to the lawyer to embody moral truth.37 We also mean
35 MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.16(b)(4); RESTATEMENT, supra note 34,
§ 32(3)(f); MODEL CODE, supra note 32, DR 2-110(C)(1)(e).
36 It is worth noting that if the conduct the client has in mind is not simply immoral but
also criminal, the boundaries of legitimate counseling by the lawyer may be considerably
broader than those described here. This discussion focuses on clients' choices among op-
tions that are legal, choices that competent clients are entitled to make. Competent clients
are not entitled to choose to commit major crimes, and lawyers are not bound by the same
duty to respect client competency in dissuading them.
37 There may be times, however, when lawyers and clients who already share a religious
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the word "convert" more metaphorically: the lawyer is not
likely to be able to alter the client's world view in some fun-
damental way, and it will rarely be fruitful or wise for her to
try. It seems safe to say that lawyers and clients will make
most progress together if they share a range of values and
jointly explore their meaning. To say this is not to require
lawyer and client to come from backgrounds as similar as
Mathiessen's and Arnholtz's, but it is important to keep in
mind, here as elsewhere, the potential impact of commonal-
ity and difference between the lawyer and client. Lawyers
and clients who seem to each other to share less will have to
travel a greater distance toward common ground before a
lawyer's moral intervention will be likely to be effective, or
welcome.
Compatibility with the legal purposes of the relationship: Moral
truth can be found in many places, but it is not the central
concern of either lawyers or clients. There is more room for
morality in some lawyer-client encounters than in others-
more room in framing a will, perhaps, than in defending
against a serious criminal charge, more room in longstanding
relationships than in new, one-time-only ones-but still, in
general, not the same room as in the confessional. The scope
of moral urging between lawyer and client needs to be con-
strained by the secular, pragmatic functions that seem to be
the principal reason clients turn to lawyers in the first
place.38
Lawyer self-interest: The goal of moral dialogue is to help clients
to do the right thing. That goal may be compromised if the
"right thing" as the lawyer sees it also happens to be what
serves the lawyer's own selfish interests best. To guard
against this, you need to examine whether your own con-
cerns and needs may be shaping your views of the client's
moral dilemma. We do not argue that the mere possibility of
conflict of interest should silence lawyers' moral counsel-
ing-there are no perfect people available to counsel others,
background pray together in the lawyer's office; we ourselves would not seek shared un-
derstanding or encouragement this way, but lawyers who follow different religious paths
might. For sharply contrasting views on the proper role of religion in the law office, com-
pare Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW.
231 (1979), with Robert J. Condlin, "What's Love Got to Do With It?" - "It's Not Like
They're Your Friends for Christ's Sake": The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer
and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. - (2003) (forthcoming).
38 John Leubsdorf and Stephen Pepper helped us understand these points.
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whether on moral grounds or merely practical ones. We do
recognize, however, that the greater the lawyer's self-inter-
est, the more the lawyer should hesitate to press views that
may ultimately be rooted in that rather than in disinterested
moral judgment.
These six factors, as we have already said, do not add up in math-
ematical fashion. We believe, however, that these considerations
rightly shape the decisions that lawyers must make about whether to
engage in moral dialogue or not. They also rightly shape decisions
about the intensity or intrusiveness of the dialogue you should under-
take, if such a conversation is undertaken at all. But even when the
moral stakes are at their highest, it would be difficult to justify under-
taking moral dialogue if it were impossible to conduct a dialogue that
actually engaged with the client without coercing him. We turn now,
therefore, to a discussion of the elements of an appropriate moral
dialogue.
B. The Methods of Moral Dialogue
How to conduct a moral dialogue is a subpart of the broader
question of how to conduct any counseling dialogue, and how to per-
suade about moral propositions is a subpart of the broader question of
how to persuade a client of any proposition at all. But the study of
moral dialogue can illuminate the broader study of counseling and
persuasion in general, and we see the Mathiessen-Arnholtz dialogue
as illustrating a number of important points about technique. Here we
emphasize two fundamental, and somewhat contrasting, lessons this
dialogue suggests.39
1. A moral dialogue is an effort at persuasion
Persuasion is a field in itself. Law students and lawyers study it in
connection with closing arguments and other trial tactics; in the con-
text of negotiations and mediations; and in brief writing and oral argu-
ment. There is undoubtedly much to be learned from the general
study of persuasion for the specific field of moral dialogue. To be sure,
many tactics we accept as legitimate in other contexts would be out of
bounds in the context of moral dialogue. A lawyer arguing a case to a
judge on behalf of a client may offer arguments he himself does not
believe should be accepted, or appeal to jurors' emotions in a way that
39 Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert F. Cochran, Jr., have also explored the elements of
moral dialogue. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLI-
ENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 94-134 (1994). Stephen Pepper has also described
some contours of these encounters, in Pepper, supra note 31, at 202-04.
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he himself hopes will distract the jurors from focusing on the evidence
in the case at hand. A negotiator may demand concessions simply on
the basis of power. Insincere arguments are out of bounds in moral
dialogue, and so are arguments or ploys meant to undercut instead of
to enhance the client's ability to think a matter through. But many of
the techniques that lawyers, or politicians, sometimes employ for
merely strategic purposes nonetheless are potentially appropriate and
helpful in the conduct of genuine moral dialogues.
Perhaps the most important point to remember is that persuasion
is rarely dispassionate. These dialogues are not academic. Instead,
they address practical and pressing issues, which both lawyer and cli-
ent probably feel strongly about. It is not wrong for you, as the lawyer,
to "come on strong." At the same time, it is wrong for you to be so
overbearing that the decision the client makes is no longer meaning-
fully his own.
Here, when Mathiessen faces the moral issue squarely with his
client, he does so in a generally appropriate-though certainly pas-
sionate-way. His style of speech is clear, emphatic and blunt. He
leaves his client no room for doubt about his (the lawyer's) position,
or about how strongly he feels about this position, and he implies in a
range of ways that what he is saying is self-evident. Thus he uses repe-
tition ("Hell hath no fury, Bill, hell hath no fury like this" (L24)), and
rhetorical questions, sometimes more than one at a time. ("Do you
think the anger will go away? How long will your wife have to think
about how you scared her into taking a bad money settlement, after
this is over?" (L25)). He uses familiar phrases, which are not only
attention-getting but also each invoke a host of folk wisdom (or folk
assumptions) 40 about human behavior that the lawyer implicitly sug-
gests his client would be foolish to ignore: "Hell hath no fury, Bill,"
(L24); and, a little later, "She won't suffer in silence, Bill." (L26) He is
by turns rueful ("Hell hath no fury . . ."), sarcastic ("She won't suffer
in silence . . ."), and impatient ("I know what threats lead to, and so
do you . . ." (L24)). He employs alliterative, memorable language:
threats, he says, "lead to fury as much as fear." (L24) He uses the
metaphor of drug addiction to drive his point home even further.
(L25) For a short stretch, probably two or three minutes, he even does
almost all the talking, with his client offering one brief objection (C24)
but otherwise carried along by the tide. (L24-L26)
He also tells, or at least sketches, a story. Here, as elsewhere,
40 On the importance of our "stock" of stories, characters and theories to our actual
understanding of much of what we experience in the world, see, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1984).
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narrative can play an important role in effective communication.41
The narrative Mathiessen traces is a vision of vengeance and feuding
and the growing, implacable rage Arnholtz's wife will feel, a prospect
that brings home the likely effects of Arnholtz' choice much more dra-
matically than, say, a reference to the statistics in the latest studies of
divorce. Within that story he tells a more specific one, again trying to
ensure that Arnholtz cannot ignore what he is saying: "I know one
couple who spent eleven years litigating their divorce. By the time it
was all over, there was nothing left to divide up-and the husband
had a terminal illness." (L25) This story's reference to mortality is
probably part of what makes it effective; if Mathiessen had said that
the fight caused the husband's illness, he would have been preposter-
ous and laughable, but his outline of the bare facts of the situation lets
Arnholtz speculate about this himself. Perhaps more important, this
offhand reference to death helps remind Arnholtz that he has only
one life to get right, an important consideration since this decision
will, Mathiessen is urging, shape the next "oh, 15 years," during which
his wife will be thinking every day about what Arnholtz did to her in
this settlement.
In short, a bluntly phrased, emotionally loaded, near-monologue
for several minutes is not excessive persuasion. Certainly this is a
judgment call, and reasonable lawyers might see Mathiessen as having
gone too far even in these few minutes. Certainly the dialogue would
have a different tinge if he had maintained this level of intensity for
much longer. (As a practical matter, effective persuasion might well
have required a longer conversation than our dialogue presents. In a
longer conversation, however, we would have expected the emotional
temperature to rise and fall, and the role of the client, overall, to be
greater than it was in these few minutes here.)
In a range of other ways Mathiessen could have crossed the line
into undue influence. The dialogue would certainly have been differ-
ent if Mathiessen had stepped out of the room and sent in an ally-
Arnholtz's brother, for example-to join in the persuasive chorus. It
would also have been a different and more troubling exchange if
Mathiessen had gone beyond intensity to tears and shouts, or cries
and whispers; this exchange is passionate but reasonably calm and that
calm is an important part of what lawyers are supposed to bring to
clients. For similar reasons this would have been a different conversa-
tion if Mathiessen had gone beyond vivid language ("It became their
drug, Bill, their addiction." (L25)) to epithets or insults ("You'll be no
better than a child-abuser, Bill."). We would also be much more dis-
41 On the importance of storytelling, even implicit storytelling, to persuasion, see, e.g.,
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 9 (1994).
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turbed if Mathiessen had made greater use of his emotional power vis-
A-vis his client, for example by saying things like "I expected better of
you" or "As a lawyer I feel your conduct is unacceptable"-though he
does seem to make some use of this sort of pressure early in the con-
versation and late, concluding with his comment (L29) that "I've been
proud to work on your case because I think you're this sort of person
.... " So, too, it would have been a much less appropriate conversa-
tion if Mathiessen had insisted that his client sign on the dotted line
then and there. Mathiessen did put pressure on his client, and obvi-
ously meant to do exactly that. There was much more that he could
have done, and did not do, however, and he appears to have avoided
losing control on this admittedly slippery slope.42
2. Inquiry and empathy are crucial components of moral dialogue
We have not faulted Mathiessen for speaking vigorously. We do
fault him for not listening better at the same time. Listening is impor-
tant in every contact with your client, and moral dialogue is no excep-
tion. It is important for you to understand what the client actually
wants to do, and to determine whether the client does have a moral
basis for doing it. Moreover, here as elsewhere, your goal should not
generally be to take the client through a series of highly focused and
directive questions that allow you to dissect the client's thinking;
rather, especially at the start, the client needs to be invited to speak
and you need to make clear that you are listening. This is all the more
important where, as is the case in a moral dialogue, you ultimately
may not be prepared to offer the client nonjudgmental empathetic re-
gard; since you may well become judgmental, you need to do every-
thing you can to still be otherwise empathetic and attentive.
Mathiessen wins the battle but loses the war as a listener. He
learns-though not very quickly-that Arnholtz wants to threaten a
custody battle, even though Arnholtz doesn't actually want custody
and really believes that his wife "has to" be the custodial parent. (L15-
C18). He also confirms that Arnholtz has a colorable legal claim for
custody, which may be what leads him to acknowledge that the strat-
egy is a legal one.43 (If it were not legal, then Mathiessen could oppose
it on quite different, and more adamant, grounds.) After hearing
42 Yet Mathiessen does make clear to Arnholtz that in the end he may withdraw from
the case rather than go along with Arnholtz's wishes. Candor may well have compelled this
revelation, but for Arnholtz this information might have operated as a threat. Lawyers of
course are not normally permitted to threaten their clients-but because the rules of ethics
do permit withdrawals for moral reasons, in some circumstances we believe lawyers can
legitimately employ this threat. The Restatement endorses such "consultation with a client
before withdrawal." RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 32 cmt. n.
43 On the status of custody threats in legal ethics, see Altman, supra note 29, at 525-26.
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Arnholtz's arguments for his own position (his partnership metaphor
(C9), his assessment of who contributed more to the marriage finan-
cially (Cli), his analogy to other hardball negotiating tactics (C19),
and his belief that his wife will scare (C23)), moreover, Mathiessen
can tell that his client has embraced this idea and a set of supporting
arguments or rationalizations-many of which perhaps come from
Arnholtz's friend. And, finally, Mathiessen can see, from Arnholtz's
angry remarks (C10, Cii, C19) and of course from his explicit ques-
tions and comments about whether Mathiessen will stick with the case
even if Arnholtz sticks with his custody threat strategy (C27-C30), that
Arnholtz has lost trust in him and found a more welcome adviser in
the "friend" who suggested this tactic to him.
But part of the hostility Mathiessen encounters may have been
triggered by his own failure to convey an empathetic understanding of
his client's wishes. Instead, Mathiessen reacts in at least three dis-
tinctly unempathetic ways. First, he tries to convey an expectation that
Arnholtz will stay on the "adult" path in this divorce. Some of his
comments to this effect seem entirely benign, such as his gentle sug-
gestion that Arnholtz should try not to lie awake re-running the
breakdown of his marriage in his mind (L5). But Arnholtz hears these
along with others whose purpose is more overtly directive, notably
Mathiessen's comment that "I've felt good about working with you
because you haven't ever made it [the divorce] worse than it had to
be. I've had some clients who I just couldn't say that about ...." (L7),
or his later reminder to Arnholtz that "you've told me, very clearly,
that you don't want [a trial], because it would only make things harder
for everyone" (Lii). Mathiessen seems to be trying to hold onto
ground he has already won with his client, rather than focusing on his
client's current feelings. That Arnholtz gets this message is most evi-
dent at the end of the interview, when Mathiessen returns to this tack,
saying that he has "too much respect for the way you've handled your-
self up till now to think that you're going to let the upset you're feel-
ing affect your judgment this way." (L28) Arnholtz responds by asking
"[h]ow can you say you respect me .... ?" (C28)
Second, Mathiessen responds to the early hints that Arnholtz has
a harsh strategy in mind in a notably analytic rather than embracing
way. When Arnholtz says, dramatically but hardly cryptically, that "I
don't want her to do this to me and then make a profit from it too,"
Mathiessen responds, "I understand that feeling, Bill, but I'm not sure
I know what you mean, concretely, as far as her not making a profit is
concerned." (C8-L9). The perfunctory claim of understanding here
gives way at once to an effort to translate that feeling into dollars and
cents. A more genuinely understanding response to the content of
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Arnholtz's remark, and one that would not have required exceptional
insight on Mathiessen's part, would have been to say, "So you're feel-
ing like the financial settlement here should make your wife pay for
what she did to you?" Rather than help Arnholtz articulate his wishes,
Mathiessen seems to be forcing him to do the work. The pattern con-
tinues in their next exchange, when Arnholtz makes a legal argument
based on his understanding of partnership law and Mathiessen re-
sponds with more "law talk" of his own, launching them on a discus-
sion of whether what Arnholtz wants is legally achievable (C9-B10)
Arnholtz finally brings them back to the issue-his desires, not
the law-at C13, when he declares, with an apology, that he "want[s]
the settlement to give my wife-I'm sorry, but this is how I feel-as
little money as possible." Although Mathiessen responds to
Arnholtz's apologetic declaration in C13 by saying "Bill, you're enti-
tled to feel that way, and you don't need to apologize to me for it"
(L14), in fact he then tries to steer Arnholtz away from the custody
threat strategy by saying, quite incorrectly, that their settlement offer
would "have to include.., enough money" for Arnholtz's wife to take
care of the kids (L16, emphasis added). When Arnholtz nevertheless
begins to suggest the custody threat strategy, Mathiessen again makes
him do the work of articulating it (L17: "I'm not sure I see where
you're going. What exactly did your friend tell you?").
Third, Mathiessen reacts so negatively to Arnholtz's proposal,
once it is finally on the table, as to suggest that he not only disagrees
with his client's plan but is appalled by it. He spells the idea out in a
way that makes it seem dishonest: "You mean, to tell her that we're
going to press for custody even though you don't actually want cus-
tody?" (L18) When Arnholtz answers "Yes, exactly," Mathiessen's re-
sponse is a pause so pregnant that Arnholtz rightly sees condemnation
looming. (L19-C20) A moment later, Mathiessen concedes the strat-
egy's viability, again with evident dismay (L22).
Mathiessen's responses may in part reflect his own passion on this
subject-and we do not believe passion is out of place in moral dia-
logue. But his responses also appear to embody a strategy, a strategy
of sustained pressure meant to dissuade his client even before the law-
yer actually offers a direct argument about the morality of the client's
choice. The strategy fails here, and may in fact have worsened the
ultimate confrontation between the two men. It would have been bet-
ter, we think, had Mathiessen been more empathetic about his client's
anger and need for revenge, and more willing to help his client articu-
late his desires in the form of a legal strategy. He might have re-
sponded to Arnholtz's intense reference to "what my friend tells me"
(C16) by saying, for example,
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L17*: Bill, I'm not sure I'm going to agree with where you're
going, but I think I understand the idea. You're hoping to
find a way to force your wife to take a small financial
settlement, right?
He might have continued by saying,
L18*: I won't beat around the bush. The most common idea that
people think about when they feel the way you do is
threatening a custody fight. Is that what you have in mind?
There is a price to this approach, namely that it may reveal to the
client an immoral tactic he hadn't yet thought of. But it hardly seems,
at this point, that Arnholtz is unaware of this gambit. Had Mathiessen
been more forthcoming and thus sustained his emotional alliance with
the client further into the conversation, he might have been able to
make a strong moral argument without putting the continuation of the
lawyer-client relationship so completely at risk. As it is, his vigorous
attempts at persuasion may have fallen on deaf ears.
CONCLUSION
We begin and end with listening. Effective inquiry and sensitive
expression of empathy are skills, essential to the forging of connection
with clients, as we saw in both Parts I and II. They are also ethical
obligations, however, as Part III reminds us. They are integral to shap-
ing relationships through which you can effectively assist your cli-
ents-and effective service is itself an ethical responsibility of lawyers.
They are no less integral to developing relationships that honor clients
as people entitled to respect-even respect expressed in the form of
challenging moral intervention-and that respect, we believe, is
equally an ethical responsibility of our profession. That said, we also
return to another beginning point, a recognition that no formula can
prescribe how a lawyer should thoughtfully handle an individual case.
We hope that readers of this book (and of these excerpts) will find the
lessons of these dialogues helpful as you formulate and apply your
own theories of representation in your cases.
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